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Chapter 1 examines the impact of marital dissolution on women’s school investment.  Using the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohort, I use a semiparametric model to estimate 
both short-term and long-term effects of marital dissolution on women’s school enrollment and 
educational attainment.  The results indicate that women’s school enrollment increases by 28% 
three years after marital dissolution and that the impact of marital dissolution persists 8 years 
after marital disruption.  The impact of marital dissolution is largest for women with an 
education of a high school diploma or less.  Furthermore, the share of income generated by the 
husband during marriage is positively associated with the magnitude of the marital dissolution 
effect.  I also show that divorced women begin to experience an increase in completed years of 
education 6 years after marital dissolution, primarily because many of these women are part-time 
students.   
Chapter 2 uses variation in the effectiveness of child support enforcement to identify the 
effect of child support income on paid employment of single mothers.  Employing data from the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation, I find that child support income has a positive 
effect on the paid employment of previously married single mothers; each $1,000 increase in 
child support income increases the likelihood of paid employment by 6.7 percentage points.  The 
effect is localized to lower-educated single mothers, for whom a $1,000 increase in child support 
income increases the likelihood of paid employment by 18.2 percentage points.   
Chapter 3 uses data drawn from two cohorts of youth from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 1979 and 1997 (NLSY79 and NLSY97), we examine the relationship between 
teen parenthood and various socioeconomic indicators, with careful attention to the role of 
family- and individual-level unmeasured heterogeneity. We find that teen mothers in the 
NLSY79 had a larger employment penalty than teen mothers in the NLSY97, but teen mothers in 
the NLSY97 had a larger poverty penalty than teen mothers in the NLSY79.  The results for men 
suggest that much of the observed correlation between teen fatherhood and the socioeconomic 
outcomes studied dissipate when controlling for unobserved family-level characteristics.  
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CHAPTER 1 
MARITAL DISSOLUTION AND WOMEN’S SCHOOL INVESTMENT 
 
1 Introduction 
 
This study examines the impact of marital dissolution on women’s school investment.  Marital 
dissolution continues to be a destabilizing event for many women.  As of 2007, more than 40% 
of marriages were expected to end in divorce (Wilcox, 2009).  In general, the economic 
consequences of marital dissolution are severe, with women bearing much of the hardship.
1
 On 
average, women who remain single after a divorce experience a 14% decline in per capita 
income (McKeever and Wolfinger, 2001).  This decline likely exerts pressure on women to 
increase their income in order to maintain their pre-divorce standard of living.  In addition, if 
intra-marriage specialization is important, one should expect adjustments to human capital 
investment for women after their marriage dissolves.  Numerous studies address changes in 
income and labor supply following divorce, but changes in education have been ignored.   
In this study, I use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) Cohort to 
investigate the impact of marital dissolution on women’s school investment.2  First, I estimate 
difference-in-difference models with nonparametric leads and lags that allow me to examine the 
time pattern of the impact of marital dissolution on school investment.  In each round, NLSY79 
respondents report changes in their marital and school enrollment status.  Therefore, I am able to 
trace out the time pattern of marital dissolution effects on school enrollment in a manner that 
puts little structure on this pattern.  In addition, by examining pre-divorce trends, I can determine 
whether there is any evidence that the timing of marital dissolution is endogenous to the school 
enrollment decision.   
Second, I examine changes in completed years of schooling following marital 
dissolution.  Previous studies suggest that nontraditional students are more likely to quit school 
                                               
1
 There are a few studies that have not concluded that women, on average, suffer economic hardship following 
marital dissolution.  For example, Bedard and Deschenes (2005) use the sex of the first born child as an instrumental 
variable for divorce and data from the 1980 U.S. Census to show that ever-divorced women have significantly 
higher levels of adjusted household income.  Nevertheless, using Quantile Treatment Effect methodology and the 
same instrument for marital disruption as Bedard and Eschenes, Ananat and Michaels (2008) show that marital 
dissolution increases the variance of income.  In other words, marital disruption leads some women to have higher 
incomes as well as some women to be poor, which exacerbates poverty and inequality (Ananat and Michaels, 2008). 
2
 In this paper, marital dissolution is defined as divorce or marital separation. 
 8 
than their traditional counterparts.
3
 Therefore, I investigate whether post-divorce school 
enrollment translates to completed years of school.   
Finally, I estimate a more parsimonious model in order to examine how the impact of 
marital dissolution differs by the woman’s characteristics.  For instance, in the event of divorce, 
women with education of high school diploma or less may find it optimal to obtain more 
education rather than increase hours of work.  Therefore, to estimate differential effects, the 
marital dissolution indicator is interacted with individual and household characteristics. 
My findings provide evidence that marital dissolution leads to substantial increases in 
women’s school investment.  In particular, the results indicate that marital dissolution increases 
the probability that women enroll in school by 2.5 percentage points (or 28%) 3 years after 
marital dissolution and that the impact of marital dissolution remains positive 8 years after 
marital disruption.  I find that the impact of marital dissolution is largest for women with an 
education of a high school diploma or less.  Furthermore, the share of income generated by the 
husband during marriage is positively associated with the magnitude of the marital dissolution 
effect.  This suggests that the elimination of household specialization tends to lead to school 
enrollment in the event of marital disruption.   
I also find that divorced women are successful in converting school enrollment into 
completed years of education.  I show that divorce has a positive impact on completed years of 
education that grows until it becomes statistically significant 6 years after marital dissolution, 
with the slow growth primarily because many of these women are part-time students.         
The large majority of studies that examine the economic consequences of marital 
dissolution find that women experience serious reductions in post-divorce income.  For example, 
Burkhauser et al. (1991) compare the United States with Germany using data from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the German Socio-Economic Panel, respectively.  They 
find that after divorce women and children suffer greater income losses than men in both 
countries.  Bianchi et al. (1999) use Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data 
from the 1980s and early 1990s and find that divorced women who are the custodial parent have 
needs adjusted income levels at 56% of their former spouse’s income levels. More recently, 
McKeever and Wolfinger (2001) use data from the National Survey of Families and Households 
                                               
3
 A traditional college student is a young person who enrolls in college immediately following high school 
graduation, enrolls as a full-time student, relies on parental support to finance college costs, and plans to complete a 
baccalaureate degree in four years (Seftor and Turner, 2002). 
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(NSFH) to show that women who remain single after a divorce, on average, experience a 14% 
decline in per capita income.  Thus, although the labor force participation rate of married women 
has increased in recent years, it remains true that women tend to experience a decline in 
economic wellbeing following divorce.     
This decline in economic well-being likely exerts pressure on women to increase their 
income.  One clear way to do so is to increase their labor supply.  Indeed, numerous studies 
examine changes in women’s labor supply following divorce.  Johnson and Skinner use the PSID 
to investigate the effect of marital dissolution on the labor supply of women.  They find that 
women’s average labor supply increases from 1024 hours one year prior to marital dissolution to 
1551 hours four years following the separation.  Haurin (1989) uses the National Longitudinal 
Survey’s mature women’s cohort to measure reactions of a married woman’s labor supply to 
shocks to her household, and finds in a dynamic choice model that divorced and separated 
women increase their work hours shortly after marital dissolution.  Finally, Couch et al. (2011) 
use the 2004 SIPP panel and records from the Social Security Administration to assess the 
implications of divorce for women’s earnings.  Consistent with previous studies, they find 
positive effects of marital dissolution on women’s earnings.   
 Human capital investment is an alternative, or possibly complementary, channel for 
raising earnings after divorce.  Women lacking sufficient labor market skills or experience may 
find it difficult to acquire employment that compensates for the loss of the husband’s income.  
For example, Bianchi et al. (1999) show that the post-dissolution gender gap in earnings is lower 
if the wife was a full-time worker and above-average earner during marriage.   
The loss of income that follows marital dissolution can be somewhat offset by child 
support and remarriage.  Nevertheless, in many cases, these alternative sources of income fail to 
compensate for the loss of income that follows divorce (Bartfield, 2000; Waller and Plotnick, 
2001).    For divorced women with children, the child support program provides services to 
assure they have the resources needed to support their children.  Nevertheless, it is often the case 
that poor women who are eligible for child support fail to receive it.  For example, Sorensen and 
Zibman (2000) report that in 1996, only 29% of poor children who had a parent living elsewhere 
received child support.  Moreover, Peters et al. (1993) find that compliance with child support 
orders varies from month to month, and that informal modifications change in response to 
economic circumstances.  
 10 
Remarriage is yet another way to alter the economic consequences of martial dissolution 
for women.
4
  Bianchi and McArthur (1991) find that children whose mothers remarried or 
reconciled had nearly twice the income-to-needs ratio as those who remained in mother-only 
families.  However, remarriage is a less successful strategy for low-educated divorced women.  
Smock (1990) uses data from the National Survey of Families and Households and finds that 
educational attainment is positively associated with remarriage among black women.  For white 
women, education has minimal or no systematic relationship to the likelihood of remarriage 
(Smock, 1990).   
 The literature has mostly been silent on the impact of marital dissolution on women’s 
school investment.
5
  This is surprising because nontraditional students now occupy a 
considerable portion of college classrooms.  The percent of enrolled college students over the 
age of 30 increased from 15% in 1970 to 29% in 1997 (Lalumia 2011).  In 2007, students age 35 
and older accounted for nearly 17% of students enrolled in degree granting institutions and about 
32% of part-time students (U.S. Department of Education, 2009).  Perhaps more significantly, 
adult school enrollment is associated with an increase in wages.  Leigh and Gill (1997) find that 
the average community college student (with no four-year college experience), who enrolls but 
does not attain a degree earns 9 to 13% more than the average high school graduate with similar 
high school grades and/or test scores between the age of 29 and 38.  Other studies find that each 
year of credit at a community college is associated with a 5-8% increase in annual earnings—the 
same as the estimated value of a year’s worth of credit at a four-year college (Monk-Turner, 
1994; Grubb, 1995; Kane and Rouse, 1995).   In a more recent study, Jacobson et al. (2005) 
utilize administrative data on displaced workers from the state of Washington to estimate the 
wage effects of community college enrollment.  They find that community college retraining 
increases the wages of older women by 10%.   
 
                                               
4
 Cohabitation is perhaps a less reliable avenue for divorced women to increase their standard of living.  Winkler 
(1997) finds that, as a group, cohabitors do not pool income.  Income pooling is more likely for couples that have a 
biological child and for those in longer-term relationships (Winkler 1997).  In contrast, Kenney (2004) finds that 
cohabiting couples generally pool resources. Nevertheless, cohabitation appears to be negatively related to 
education.  For example, Lichter and Qian (2008) find that serial cohabitions, which are less likely to end in 
marriage, are more likely among women with low education.   
5
 Stevenson (2007) considers how divorce laws affect the incentives for couples to invest in their marriage by 
focusing on the impact of unilateral divorce laws on investment decisions of couples in their first 2 years of 
marriage, using the 1970 and 1980 censuses.  The results show that newlywed couples in states that allow unilateral 
divorce are about 10% less likely to be supporting a spouse through school. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 provides a theoretical 
framework for analyzing the relationship between divorce and women’s school investment.  The 
data are described in Section 3.  Section 4 contains the empirical model as well as assumptions 
underlying the identification of the parameter estimates. Results are presented in Section 5, and 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2 Theoretical Framework 
 
A priori, it is unclear how marital dissolution will affect the school investment of divorced 
women.  Economic models of divorce developed by Becker et al. (1977), Landes (1978), and 
Peters (1986) argue that divorce occurs when joint marital satisfaction is less than the joint level 
attainable by each partner separated.  In the event of divorce, the loss of specialization in the 
household increases time devoted to the market and would then increase returns to investing in 
marketable human capital.  Thus, women’s returns to education may increase due to marital 
dissolution. 
Even if the returns to education were not higher in the divorced state, marital dissolution 
may affect school enrollment by changing women’s ability to pool risk.  For example, in a 
marriage the husband may increase labor supply if the wife is ill or unemployed.
6
  Thus, divorce 
may cause some women to seek jobs less affected by unemployment because they no longer 
have the husband’s entire earnings as insurance.  This is a real concern for less educated 
individuals, who are more likely to be dismissed from their job than more educated individuals 
(Campbell III, 1997).    
Marital dissolution may also have a nonpositive effect on women’s school enrollment.  
Because men are unable to control the allocation of resources by women if they live apart, men 
are likely to contribute less income to the woman’s household when divorced as compared to the 
when married (Weiss & Willis, 1985).  Additionally, the economies of scale that women 
experience in marriage is no longer realized in the divorced state.  Therefore, women may have 
less income that is available to apply to schooling costs.  The loss of income and economies of 
scale following a divorce changes the woman’s budget constraint and disposable income, which 
                                               
6
Good medical or unemployment insurance makes this less of a concern (Weiss, 1997). 
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may have a negative impact on school enrollment in the presence of credit constraints.  Several 
studies provide evidence that credit access is a determinant of college enrollment.  For example, 
Belley and Lochner (2007) use the NLSY79 and NLSY97 and show an increase over time in the 
effects of family income on college attendance.  Their theoretical model suggests that borrowing 
constraints are responsible for the growing effects of family income on college attendance.  In 
addition, Lovenheim (2011) finds evidence that housing wealth influences school enrollment of 
18-22 year olds, which he suggests is consistent with a credit constraint explanation.
7
    
These predictions of the impact of divorce on women’s school investment are not 
mutually exclusive.  Divorce could simultaneously increase returns to education, alter risk 
pooling, and reduce the amount of income.  To the extent that these outcomes have differential 
effects on school enrollment, simple models that examine divorce and schooling do not yield 
unique predictions about the impact of divorce on women’s school investment.  Consequently, it 
is necessary to analyze empirically the effect that divorce has on women’s school enrollment.   
 
3 Data 
The empirical analysis uses data on women drawn from the 1981-2008 panels of the NLSY79.  
The NLSY79 is a nationally representative sample of 12,686 men and women who were 14-22 
years old during the first round of interviews in 1979.  The sample members were interviewed 
annually until 1994 and are currently interviewed biannually.
8
  The NLSY79 cohort is comprised 
of three subsamples:  a cross-sectional sample of 6,111 respondents designed to represent the 
non-institutionalized United States population; a supplemental sample of 5,295 Hispanic, black, 
and economically disadvantaged nonblack/non-Hispanic respondents; and a sample of 1,280 
respondents constructed to represent the population serving in the United States military as of 
September 30, 1978.  Because approximately 1,100 military sample members and all 
economically disadvantaged, nonblack/non-Hispanic sample members were ineligible for 
interview after 1984 and 1990, respectively, these subsamples are excluded from the analysis.  
                                               
7
 In contrast, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) find that the long run factors that shape ability are the major 
determinants of the family income-schooling relationship. 
8
 Following Ahituv and Lerman (2005), I obtain information for odd-post-1994 years by designating a “quasi-
interview” month, 12 months prior to actual interview month in the succeeding year.  Fortunately, the NLSY79 
includes school enrollment history on a monthly basis that makes it possible to recover the necessary information for 
odd-post-1994 years.  A complete description of variables for post-1994 years is contained in the appendix. 
 13 
The longitudinal nature of this survey and its detailed marriage, educational attainment, and 
school enrollment questions make it well suited for my analysis. 
The NLSY79 questionnaire contains comprehensive information on the timing of past 
changes in marital status, which allows the creation of a complete marital history for each 
person.  In this study, marital dissolution is defined as being either a divorce or marital 
separation.  For individuals who report dates for marital separation and divorce, the date of 
marital dissolution corresponds to the date of marital separation. The longitudinal nature of the 
survey enables researchers to follow the same respondents over time, which makes it possible to 
examine the respondent’s schooling decisions before and after marital dissolution. For this 
analysis, I focus on changes in school enrollment behavior due to the disruption of the first 
marriage.
9
 Therefore, I exclude respondents who had experienced more than one marriage before 
round one of the survey. 
Information on the respondent’s schooling experiences is collected during each survey 
round.  After round one, respondents are asked if they have attended or been enrolled in regular 
school since the date of last interview.  Regular school is defined as a school that provides credit 
toward an academic degree or diploma.  For survey years 1981-2008, respondents are asked the 
months that they attended school since the since the last interview.  This analysis utilizes two 
dependent variables:  number of months enrolled in the prior calendar year and an indicator for 
school participation during the prior calendar year.  The respondents are considered to be 
enrolled if they have attended school for at least one month during the previous calendar year.  
School measures are obtained for the prior calendar year, as opposed to the time since the last 
interview date, because the interview schedule changed after 1986.
10
  Additionally, the analysis 
sample is restricted to person-year observations for women who are at least 20 years of age.  This 
is done to avoid years of mandatory high school enrollment.  
 
 
 
                                               
9
 The effects of divorce from remarriages likely reflect difference properties than first marriages (Couch et al., 
2011).   
10
 The first NLSY79 interviews were administered between late January and mid-August 1979.  Before survey year 
1987, the interviews were conducted during the first six months of year, which allowed all respondents still in 
school to be interviewed before leaving for summer jobs.  The fielding period varies after 1987. 
 14 
3.1 Demographic Characteristics 
 
The NLSY79 also contains detailed demographic information about each respondent and 
household.  I create measures of the woman’s age, race, education, number of children under 18 
living in the household, and an indicator for having a child under age 1.  These variables are 
taken directly from the NLSY79 and are measured as of the current year of the survey. 
 
3.2 Labor Market Measures   
 
In a manner similar to Murphy and Welch (1992), I use the wage differential for 25-34 year old, 
full-time workers (at least 35 hours per week) in the respondent’s state of residence as a proxy 
for the education premium.  This differential is computed as the log difference between the 
average wage of individuals whose education is one level above the respondent and the average 
wage of individuals who share the respondent’s education level, where the education levels are 
less than high school diploma, high school diploma, some college (no B.A.), and college 
graduate (B.A. or higher).  For example, the earnings differential for a respondent who has a high 
school diploma is the log difference between the average wage of individuals with some college 
and those who are high school graduates.  Low program completion rates for nontraditional 
students motivate the construction of the average premiums for individuals in the state.  The 
measures are constructed using the March Current Population Survey (CPS).  Three-year moving 
averages are used because the March CPS is a nationally representative sample, but not 
representative of the state’s population.  
 
3.3 Analysis Sample  
In order to identify changes in schooling trends that are due to marital dissolution, Separated and 
Intact samples are constructed.  To be included in the Separated Sample, women must be 
observed in their first marriage for at least three survey rounds and at least one survey round 
after divorce.  The Intact Sample includes women who are observed in their first marriage for at 
least four survey rounds of the NLSY79.  These criteria ensure that a detailed history is available 
for every respondent.  Also, focusing on marriages that remain intact for at least 3 survey rounds 
focuses the analysis on women who have had substantial time to invest in their marriage.  
 15 
Furthermore, since the dates of marriage and marital dissolution are central to the analysis, 
dropped from the analysis are women whose marriage or marital disruption dates are missing.  
After inspecting for coding errors, the Intact Sample consisted of 1,713 and the Separated 
Sample included 1,280 women. 
Table 1.1 compares selected variables for the Intact and Separated Sample.  Aside from 
the portions who are Hispanic, there are few similarities between the samples.  For example, the 
average AFQT score percentiles are 56 and 47 for women in the Intact and Separated Samples, 
respectively.  The average age at marriage for women in the Separated sample is 21.7, which is 
approximately 2.8 years less than the average age for women in the Intact Sample.  Women from 
the Intact Sample are also closer in age to their first husband than are women in the Separated 
Sample.  The average age differences from their spouses are 2.47 and 3.03 years for the Intact 
and Separated Sample, respectively.  In addition, women in the Separated Sample are more 
likely to begin the marriage without a high school diploma and less likely to begin marriage with 
a bachelor’s degree.  In general, the Separated Sample appears to be less advantaged than the 
Intact Sample. 
  
3.4 Trends in School Enrollment Outcomes   
 
 It is useful to examine trends in women’s school enrollment by divorce status before launching 
an empirical examination of the effect of marital dissolution on women’s schooling.  Figure 1.1 
shows women’s average number of months enrolled according to the number of years preceding 
or following divorce.  These averages, which include women who did not attend school, show a 
decrease in the average number of months enrolled from the fifth year before the divorce (.74 
months) to the year of divorce (.54 months).  Following divorce, there is an increase in the 
average number of months enrolled to about .76 months in the fourth year after dissolution.  
Thus, from the year of dissolution to the fourth year after dissolution, the average number of 
months enrolled in school increased by 40.7%.  A substantial portion of this increase can be 
accounted for by increased school enrollment.  Figure 1.2 shows that the percent of Separated 
Sample members enrolled in school at any time during the previous calendar year increased from 
9.4% during the year of divorce to 11.9% in the fourth year after dissolution, an increase of 
26.6%. 
 16 
 It is common for individuals to make schooling investments early in life so as to 
maximize the number of years they have access to the returns to their schooling decision. 
Therefore, the number of months enrolled in school and the enrollment rate are expected to 
decrease as the sample ages.  Therefore, it is instructive to compare trends in schooling outcomes 
for the Separated and Intact Samples.  Following Johnson and Skinner (1986), Intact Sample 
averages are modified to reflect the calendar year composition of school outcomes for women in 
the Separated Sample.  For example, if half the observations for 2 years before the divorce came 
from 1984 and half from 1997, then the appropriate comparison for the Intact Sample is the 
average of the school outcome in 1984 and 1997.  Looking at Figures 1.1 and 1.2, across both 
samples, there is a persistent downward trend in school outcomes prior to dissolution.  However, 
in contrast to the Separated Sample, the Intact Sample does not experience an increase in the 
enrollment rate or average number of months during the survey period.  Thus, Figures 1.1 and 
1.2 provide descriptive evidence that women increase school investment following divorce.   
 Although serious consideration of the effect of marital dissolution on men is beyond the 
scope of this paper, for purposes of comparison, men’s average number of months enrolled is 
presented in Figure 1.3.  Men in both the Intact and Separated Samples experience a decrease in 
the average number of months enrolled during the period of marriage.  In addition, the Intact 
Sample has higher rates of enrollment than do men in the Separated sample at each period.   
Unlike the Separated Sample for women, men in the Separated Sample do not experience an 
increase in enrollment following dissolution.  This suggests that post-divorce changes in men’s 
preferences and/or income does not promote school enrollment of divorced men. 
 Although Figures 1 and 2 provide descriptive evidence that divorce may have a positive 
impact on women’s school enrollment, interview nonresponse provides an alternative 
explanation for the increase in school enrollment that follows divorce.  More specifically, a 
recent divorce may increase the likelihood that women are unable to complete an interview.  If 
women who are absent from the survey following a divorce are also less likely to enroll in 
school, their absence from the sample during the survey rounds immediately following divorce 
would inflate post-divorce schooling outcomes in the Separated Sample.  For example, some 
respondents exit and reenter the sample after a temporary residential move, which is more likely 
 17 
following a divorce.
11
  However, there is some evidence that this is not an issue.  For example, 
Fitzgerald et al. (1998) use the PSID to analyze sample attrition and find that while men who 
moved recently or who show a high average propensity to move are more likely to attrite, no 
significant effects appear for women.  To investigate this issue using the NLSY79, I present the 
nonresponse rates by when the individual experienced a divorce.  In Figure 1.4, the dependent 
variable takes on a value of one if the respondent did not complete the survey, where time is 
measured relative to the date of divorce.  As before, the averages for the Intact Sample are 
modified to reflect the calendar year composition of the Separated Sample.  Surprisingly, the 
nonresponse rates for the Separated Sample are lower than for Intact Sample.  Most importantly, 
the trend in the nonresponse rate for the Separated Sample closely tracks that of the Intact 
Sample.  In addition, the nonresponse rate of the Separated Sample does not experience an 
increase following divorce, which suggests that sample attrition does not account for the 
observed increase in the probability of school enrollment following divorce. 
 Another explanation for trends presented in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 is that the anticipation of 
divorce may limit women’s education opportunities.  For example, the respondent’s husband 
may be less likely to invest in her schooling if he suspects divorce is inevitable.  In this case, the 
woman may file for divorce in order to attend school.  Thus, we would expect to see a decrease 
in the probability of school enrollment shortly before marital dissolution.
12
  Indeed, Stevenson 
(2007) finds that new couples are less likely to support each other through school when unilateral 
dissolution laws are enacted.  However, Figures 1.1 and 1.2 does not provide evidence that 
selection based on previous enrollment is a key determinant of the increase in schooling 
following divorce.  The school outcomes for the Separated Sample does not exhibit breaks from 
the trend prior to divorce.  In fact, the averages move similarly across the Separated and Intact 
Sample prior to dissolution, which provides descriptive evidence that selection on school 
outcomes is not driving the increase in schooling after divorce.  Nonetheless, a more formal test 
is provided later. 
                                               
11
 Women may exit the survey during stressful periods.  If the amount of dissolution related stress is correlated with 
the propensity to enroll, the marital dissolution effect could be biased.  However, using the British Household Panel 
Survey, Oswald (2006) finds that women reap psychological gains due to marital separation—in other words, they 
are happier after dissolution. 
12
 In the training literature it has been highlighted that, in many instances, a decrease in earnings precedes 
enrollment in the program because program managers usually enroll those individuals with recent labor market 
problems (Ashenfelter, 1978; Ashenfelter and Card, 1985; Heckman and Smith, 1994). 
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 While Figures 1.1 and 1.2 yield descriptive evidence that marital dissolution has a 
positive impact on women’s school investment, it is difficult to interpret the sharp increase in 
schooling after marital dissolution as causal because the samples may experience different 
secular variation in school enrollment.  Identification of the treatment effect of interest is 
confounded if the Intact and Separated Samples experience different secular variation in school 
enrollment.  Although it does not appear the case that the two samples have differing secular 
trends in enrollment, a more valid approach is to use Intact Sample members in each state to 
control for counterfactual trends.  The remainder of this paper uses methods that control for 
individual fixed effects to identify the effect of marital dissolution on women’s schooling. 
 
 
4 Empirical Strategy 
 
 
To examine the effect of marital dissolution on women’s school enrollment, I estimate the 
following equation on the Intact and Separated Samples: 
 
                                                 
where  represents the school enrollment measure of interest in the previous calendar year,  
is a vector of time -varying individual characteristics and   is a vector of time-varying state 
characteristics that are listed in Section 4.2,   are individual fixed effects,  are state-specific 
year effects, and  is an error term.    is a binary variable that equals one if 
person  is  years from divorce and zero otherwise, where   indicates the year in which 
person  divorced.
 13
  For individuals in the Intact Sample and observations for Separated Sample 
members for which relative year to divorce is outside the event window, these indicator variables 
are assigned zero.  The event window is from 5 years prior to dissolution to 10 years post 
dissolution because sample sizes decline beyond this range and because any meaningful 
relationship between marital dissolution and educational attainment should be expected to take 
                                               
13
 In an influential study, Jacobson et.al (1993) use this method to examine the earnings losses of displaced workers.  
More recently, Lovenheim (2009) uses this methodology to estimate the effect of teacher’s unions on student 
educational attainment.   
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place within 10 years of the date of marital dissolution.  Excluded from this analysis are 
observations from the Separated Sample for which time since divorce is greater than 10 years. 
 Equation (1) semiparametrically estimates both short-term and long-term effects of the 
independent variable of interest, marital dissolution, and is more general than using a single 
binary variable for dissolution.  The inclusion of dummy variables for each year relative to 
marital dissolution places no structure on the pattern of time trends either before or after 
dissolution.  Moreover, marital dissolution may have nonlinear effects on women over time that 
will be obscured by imposing the parametric assumption that the impacts are equal, which makes 
the flexibility of equation (1) important.
14
  It is theoretically possible that the effects of marital 
dissolution might diminish over time—mainly due to the completion of the respondent’s desired 
level of education. 
 Another benefit of equation (1) is that it includes individual fixed effects.  If marital 
dissolution depends on time-invariant unobservable characteristics that are correlated with both 
the decision to divorce and school enrollment outcomes, cross-sectional estimates will be biased.  
However, the fixed effects model compares the same woman at different times relative to the 
year of divorce and controls for any unobservable (and time invariant) effects. 
 The principal identifying assumption is 
 
Satisfaction of (2) requires, conditional on time-varying individual and state variables and fixed 
effects, the timing of divorce is uncorrelated with potential outcomes.  Estimates of the  
parameters from equation (1) will be biased if there is selection into divorce based on pre-
divorce school enrollment trends.  Further, if women’s school enrollment is affected by the 
anticipation of divorce, it will become evident in the estimates for years preceding divorce.  To 
test for any selection on the outcome variable that may be a determinant of the dissolution 
decision, I estimate  prior to dissolution   Instead of controlling for differential pre-
treatment trends across the Intact and Separated Sample, this difference-in-difference approach 
enables me to test directly for the existence of such trends.
15
  In addition, it is plausible that 
                                               
14
 For example, the college admission and financial aid process may force recently divorced women to delay 
admissions by at least a year.   
15
 The NLSY79 panel is unbalanced with respect to relative year to separation.  Consequently, each  is identified 
off of a likely different set of women.  An Appendix table lists the number of observations. 
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divorce is preceded by years of marital conflict.  Thus we might observe changes in enrollment 
patterns several years prior to marital dissolution.   
 Given the observed differences between the Separated and Intact samples, what effect 
can one expect these differences to have on estimates from equation (1) given that the parameter 
of interest in this study is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)?  NOTE that 
selection into divorce based on perceived or actual gains from marital dissolution will not bias 
identification of the ATT; however, such selection will bias identification of the average 
treatment effect.  Since individual fixed effects control for any time-invariant differences in 
enrollment among women in the analysis sample, what is required to identify the ATT is for the 
state-specific year effects to reflect counterfactual trends in enrollment for the Separated Sample.  
For that reason, correctly identifying  is the main difficulty in estimating the treatment effect 
on the Separated Sample using equation (1). 
State-specific yearly variation in the dependent variable from the Intact Sample identifies 
the state-specific year effects, .  The estimates from equation (1) use the Intact Sample 
combined with all observations for which relative year to divorce is less than or equal to 10 and 
are presented in Appendix Table B1.3.  The Intact Sample and those observations for which 
relative year to dissolution is less than -5 make up the control group.  This sample is appealing 
because it uses all observations that conceivably are unaffected by marital dissolution, which 
allows for the most power in identifying all parameters of equation (1).  In Section 6.2, I provide 
a series of robustness checks that illustrate that my estimates are not sensitive to the control 
group used.   
Although equation (1) is a more flexible model, a model with fewer parameters is 
preferred when examining how the impact of divorce differs by various characteristics. Equation 
(3) is a more parsimonious model than equation (1), containing two mutually exclusive terms:  
(1) , which equals 1 if the woman’s first marriage has dissolved by period  and 0 
otherwise, and (2) , which takes a value of 1 during the 3 years prior to divorce: 
 
 
  
 In order to estimate differential effects, the divorced indicator is interacted with 
individual and household characteristics.  For example, the magnitude of the divorce effect may 
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depend on the share of household income generated by the husband during the last year of 
marriage.  An obvious reason for this assertion is that women who earned significantly less than 
their former spouse may obtain additional education in order to be less dependent on their former 
spouse’s transfer payments—especially since child support receipt is a function of the economic 
circumstances of the noncustodial parent.  In addition, the impact of marital dissolution may 
differ by education—for instance, the impact of marital dissolution on school enrollment may 
decline as the woman’s level of education increases because of the positive association between 
wages and education.  
 
5 Empirical Results 
 
Figures 1.5 and 1.6 plot the estimates of  from equation (1) for school enrollment and number 
of months enrolled, respectively.  The points depict the estimates of the  coefficients from each 
relative-year-to-dissolution binary variable, while the height of the bars stretching from each 
point represent the bounds of the 95% confidence interval from the standard errors that are 
clustered at the individual level.
 16
  Regression estimates for the results in Figures 1.5 and 1.6 are 
presented in Appendix Tables A1.3 and A1.4. 
Consistent with the trends in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, the results provide evidence that marital 
dissolution has a positive impact on school enrollment.  Focusing on Figure 1.5, school 
enrollment is comparable for the treatment and control groups three years prior to marital 
dissolution and remains similar until one year after marital dissolution.  However, the probability 
of school enrollment increases by approximately 2.5 percentage points (or 27%) 3 years after 
marital dissolution ( .  This is a sizable effect.  For example, it is equal to the effect of a 
13% increase in women’s school wage premium. 
In Figure 1.6, the results indicate that the average number of months enrolled in school in 
the prior calendar year increases by .164 months (or 28%).  In both Figures 1.4 and 1.5, the point 
estimates for post-dissolution years 3 through 7 are statistically distinguishable from zero at the 
10% level, or better.  Moreover, using an F-test, I fail to reject the joint hypothesis that 
                                               
16
 The  coefficients identify treatment effects relative to the effect for the year before separation, .  I include a 
zero for the point estimates in relative year  but omit standard errors bars due to the fact that this zero is 
imposed rather than estimated. 
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.  Thus, there is no evidence that there is selection into divorce timing based on 
recent school enrollment patterns.
17
   
While Figures 1.5 and 1.6 provide evidence that marital dissolution has a positive impact 
on the probability of school enrollment, the figures do not address the question of whether these 
women are completing additional years of education.  Divorced women are classified as 
nontraditional students, and these students are more likely to quit school than their traditional 
counterparts (Horn and Carroll, 1996).  For example, 38% of nontraditional students leave school 
in their first year (Horn and Carroll, 1996).  Therefore, in order to examine the impact of marital 
dissolution on completed years of education, I estimate equation (1) using highest grade 
completed as the dependent variable. 
Figure 1.7 plots the point estimates from equation (1) for highest grade completed and 
regression estimates are in Appendix Table A1.5.  I find that marital dissolution has a positive 
impact on the highest grade completed in the first 5 years following marital dissolution, but that 
it then increases by .06 years in the 6
th
 year after marital dissolution and remains at this level or 
higher for the remainder of the event window.  This is consistent with the fact that enrollment 
does not peak until four years after marital dissolution and that most nontraditional students 
attend school part-time.  Consequently, it takes several years before marital dissolution has a 
positive impact on educational attainment.   
 
5.1     Robustness Checks 
As discussed in Section 5, the critical assumption underlying identification of the  coefficients 
in equation (1) is the use of a suitable control group to account for secular variation in school 
enrollment outcomes.  Recall that figures 1.1 and 1.2 provide evidence that my estimates should 
not be overly sensitive to the within-state Intact Sample that I use as a control group.  
Nevertheless, I assess the frailty of my results to the choice of estimation sample by estimating 
(1) using additional samples that each suggests a different control group.  First, I restrict the 
estimation sample to include only the Intact Sample and the person-year observations for which 
the relative time to marital dissolution falls within the event window.  Thus the control group is 
composed of only the Intact Sample.  This control group is attractive relative to the control group 
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used to produce the main estimates because it will be unaffected by the effects of marital 
dissolution on the dependent variable more than 5 years prior to marital dissolution.  In addition, 
I obtain estimates using only those person-year observations for which the relative time to 
marital dissolution is less than or equal to 10.  This sample is the same as the one used to 
estimate the parameters displayed in figures 1.4 and 1.5, but it omits the Intact Sample. 
 As expected, estimates from these robustness checks are similar in both magnitude and 
quality to those shown in Appendix Table A1.4, where the dependent variable is the number of 
months enrolled in school.  Once again, the evidence suggests that marital dissolution has a 
positive impact on women’s school enrollment.  While the estimated effects reported in column 
2 of table A1.6 are less precise than the estimates in table A1.4, they are qualitatively similar.  In 
addition, there is little evidence that trends in enrollment are correlated with the timing of marital 
dissolution.  I fail to reject an F-test that , at any reasonable level of statistical 
significance. 
 
5.2 Impact by Individual and Household Characteristics 
 
Thus far the analysis has focused on the average effect of marital dissolution, but the impact of 
marital dissolution may differ by characteristics such as education or race.  Table 1.5, column 
(2), shows the race interaction terms are not statistically significant.  The post-dissolution effect 
is .099 and .152 for white and black women, respectively.  The magnitude of the post-dissolution 
effect for Hispanic women is .45.  However, none of these effects are significant. 
 Table 1.5 shows that the impact of marital dissolution on enrollment decisions differ by 
the woman’s education, where education is captured from the last survey round in which the 
respondent is observed married. Table 1.5, column (3) shows that the post-dissolution effect is 
largest for women who had an education of high school diploma or less when the marriage 
ended.  The post-dissolution effect is .33 and .25 for women who had less than a high school 
diploma and high school diploma, respectively.  For women who had some college and a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, the post-dissolution effect is .07 and -.74 (significant at 99% 
confidence), respectively.  These results suggests that returning to school after divorce could be 
more costly for women with some college than for women with high school diploma or less—
especially if community college is no longer an option.  Further, women with some college face 
higher opportunity costs of enrolling than women with high school diploma or less due to higher 
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wage offers.  In regards to skill retooling, women with a high school diploma or less are more 
likely than women with some college to need further schooling in achieve occupation mobility. 
 The share of the household income that the husband earned during the last round the 
marriage was observed intact is positively associated with marital dissolution impacts (Table 1.5 
column 4).  The coefficient on the interaction term of dissolution and the share of household 
income contribute by the husband is positive and significant, but small in magnitude.  For 
example, women whose husband generated 100% of household income increase the number of 
months enrolled by an additional 4%. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I add to the sizable literature on the consequences of divorce by examining the 
impact of divorce on women’s school enrollment and educational attainment.  I use an empirical 
strategy that imposes minimal structure on the dynamic response of school enrollment, and I then 
estimate a more parsimonious model in order to determine how the impact of divorce differs by 
individual characteristics.   
 Evidence from the NLSY79 suggests that divorce has a positive impact on women’s 
school enrollment.  More specifically, estimates show that the probability of school enrollment 
increases by 28% three years after marital dissolution.  The effect of marital dissolution on 
women’s school participation is the same as a 13% increase in the school wage premium.  
Moreover, the results indicate that the positive impact of marital dissolution on school 
enrollment persists 8 years after marital dissolution.  Perhaps most importantly, marital 
dissolution has a positive effect on highest grade completed that begins 6 years after marital 
dissolution and remains at this level or higher for the remainder of the event window.  I also find 
that the impact is larger for women whose husband generated a larger portion of household 
income and for women who with an education of high school diploma or less when the marriage 
dissolved.   
Understanding the consequences of divorce for women is a key agenda because a 
significant portion of divorces involves children.  Since divorced women with children are likely 
to suffer a reduction in income following divorce, they are likely to invest in human capital in 
order to increase their income.  My results suggest that policy makers should be sensitive to the 
school investment decisions of divorced women. The impact of divorce on school enrollment is 
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largest for women with a high school diploma or less education—a group vulnerable to poverty 
and unemployment.  Previous studies suggest that lowering the price of college through need-
based grants and subsidized loans is more effective than tax credits aimed at increasing the 
school enrollment of disadvantaged groups.  For example, LaLumia (2011) investigates how 
eligibility for an education tax credit affects the college attendance decision, and finds no effects 
of tax credits on women’s decision to attend college.  In contrast, Seftor and Turner (2002) find 
that changes in federal financial policy have a significant impact on the enrollment behavior of 
non-traditional students.  Thus, reductions in need-based aid may affect women’s ability to retool 
after marital dissolution.  
The central implication of this work is that policies aiming to increase the success of 
nontraditional students will likely benefit divorced women. In particular, because dropout rates 
are especially high for students attending community college, policies that increase persistence in 
community colleges are a reasonable focus if the goal is to increase the income and well-being of 
divorced women and their children.    
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Table 1.1  Descriptive Statistics for Intact and Separated Samples 
 
 Intact Sample  Separated Sample  Two-sided t-test for 
equality of means 
Number of Individuals  
 
1713 1280  
Black = 1 
 
0.08  0.13  ** 
Hispanic = 1 
 
0.05  0.07  ** 
Age at marriage  
 
24.54  21.92  ** 
  
(5.71)  (4.39)   
AFQT percentile in 1980  
 
56.70  45.03  ** 
  
(29.19)  (28.63)   
Wife’s education at 
marriage  
  Less than high school 
diploma  
   
 
  Less than high school 
diploma 
 
0.08  0.18  ** 
  High school diploma  
 
0.38  0.46  ** 
  Some college  
 
0.25  0.22   
  Bachelor’s or above  
 
0.29  0.14  ** 
Spouse’s age at marriage 
 
26.97  24.91  ** 
  
(6.81)  (5.84)   
Husband’s education at 
marriage:  
  Less than high school 
diploma  
   
 
  Less than high school 
diploma  
0.09 0.19  ** 
  High school diploma  
 
0.40  0.45  * 
  Some college  
 
0.21  0.21   
  Bachelor’s degree or 
above  
 
0.30  0.15  ** 
Marriage duration 
(years) 
  
10.24   
   
(6.06)   
NOTE:  The Intact Sample is comprised of women who were observed for at least 4 survey rounds while married 
and who did not experience marital dissolution.  The Separated Sample consists of women who were observed 
married with complete data for at least 4 survey rounds before divorce and who were observed for at least 1 survey 
round after divorce. Standard errors for continuous variables are in parentheses.  Sampling weights are used to 
construct descriptive statistics.   
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Table 1.2  Comparison of Separated and Excluded Samples 
 Separated 
Sample 
Excluded 
Sample 
Two-sided t-test for 
equality of means 
Number of Individuals  1280  921   
Black  0.13  0.17  ** 
Hispanic  0.07  0.07   
Urban residence  0.75  0.78   
AFQT in percentile in 
1980  45.03  40.00  ** 
 (28.23)  (27.86)   
Lived with biological 
parents at age 14  0.72  0.67  * 
Raised Catholic  0.31  0.27  * 
Summary statistics are based on data from round 1 of survey.  The full sample includes all women from 
NLSY79 sample except military sample.  The Separated Sample consists of women who were observed 
married with complete data for at least 3 survey rounds before divorce and who were observed for at least 
1 survey round after divorce.  The Excluded Sample includes women from full sample who are observed 
being married, but are not included in the analysis sample.  Standard errors for continuous variables are in 
parentheses.  Sampling weights are used in estimation of descriptive statistics.  
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  Figure 1.1--Women’s average months enrolled in school. The Intact Sample is comprised of women who 
were observed for at least 4 survey rounds while married and who did not experience marital dissolution.  The 
Separated Sample consists of women who were observed married with complete data for at least 3 survey 
rounds before divorce and who were observed for at least 1 survey round after divorce.  The vertical line marks 
the year when the divorce is initiated.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
 
  Figure 1.2.-- Women’s school enrollment rate. The Intact Sample is comprised of women who were 
observed for at least 4 survey rounds with while married and who did not experience marital dissolution.  
The Separated Sample consists of women who were observed married with complete data for at least 3 
survey rounds before divorce and who were observed for at least 1 survey round after divorce.    The 
vertical line marks the year when the divorce is initiated.   
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  Figure 1.3.--  Mens’s average months enrolled in school. The Intact Sample is comprised of men who were 
observed for at least 4 survey rounds with while married and who did not experience marital dissolution.  
The Separated Sample consists of men who were observed married with complete data for at least 3 survey 
rounds before divorce and who were observed for at least 1 survey round after divorce.  The vertical line 
marks the year when the divorce is initiated.   
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   Figure 1.4.-- Women’s nonresponse rates relative to year of dissolution. The Intact Sample is comprised of women 
who were observed for at least 4 survey rounds while married and who did not experience marital dissolution.  The 
Separated Sample consists of women who were observed married with complete data for at least 3 survey rounds 
before divorce and who were observed for at least 1 survey round after divorce.  The vertical line marks the year 
when the divorce is initiated.   
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  Figure 1.5.  The effect of marital dissolution on the school participation rate.  The points depict coefficient 
estimates from estimation of eq. (2) on the analysis sample, as explained in the text.  The bars extending from each 
point represent the bounds of the 95% confidence interval calculated from standard errors that are clustered at the 
individual level.  Relative year -1 is excluded in order to make all estimates relative to the year prior to dissolution.  
The exclusion of standard error bars for the point estimate in relative year  reflect that the estimate of zero is 
imposed rather than estimated. 
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  Figure 1.6.  The effect of marital dissolution on months enrolled in regular school.  The points depict coefficient 
estimates from estimation of eq. (2) on the analysis sample, as explained in the text.  The bars extending from each 
point represent the bounds of the 95% confidence interval calculated from standard errors that are clustered at the 
individual level.  Relative year -1 is excluded in order to make all estimates relative to the year prior to dissolution.  
The exclusion of standard error bars for the point estimate in relative year  reflect that the estimate of zero is 
imposed rather than estimated. 
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  Figure 1.7.  The effect of marital dissolution on highest grade completed.  The points depict coefficient estimates 
from estimation of eq. (2) on the analysis sample, as explained in the text.  The bars extending from each point 
represent the bounds of the 95% confidence interval calculated from standard errors that are clustered at the 
individual level.  Relative year -1 is excluded in order to make all estimates relative to the year prior to dissolution.  
The exclusion of standard error bars for the point estimate in relative year  reflect that the estimate of zero is 
imposed rather than estimated. 
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Table 1.5.  Ordinary Least-Squares Regression Coefficients Predicting the Impact of Marital Dissolution on 
Number of Months Enrolled in School, by Race, Education, and  Husband’s Income Share 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
BD (1-3 years) 0.036 0.057 -0.006 0.038 0.019 
 (0.060) (0.084) (0.0495) (0.060) (0.070) 
AD 0.099* 0.099 0.248*** 0.072 0.260*** 
 (0.060) (0.082) (0.057) (0.060) (0.078) 
Black x  BD  (1-3 years)  0.001   -0.031 
  (0.134)   (0.136) 
Black x  AD  0.053   0.034 
  (0.132)   (0.134) 
Hispanic x  BD  (1-3 years)  -0.054   -0.104 
  (0.152)   (0.152) 
Hispanic x  AD  -0.092   -0.171 
  (0.129)   (0.128) 
Less than high school x  BD  (1-3 
years) 
  0.093  0.120 
   (0.076)  (0.082) 
Less than high school diploma x  
AD 
  0.083  0.123 
   (0.081)  (0.086) 
Some college x  BD  (1-3 years)   0.350**  0.350** 
   (0.166)  (0.168) 
Some college x  AD   -0.175  -0.198 
   (0.157)  (0.156) 
Bachelor’s Degree  x  BD  (1-3 
years) 
  -0.299  -0.308 
   (0.274)  (0.273) 
Bachelor’s Degree x  AD   -0.980*** 
 
 -0.987*** 
   (0.252)  (0.252) 
Husband’s income share x  BD  
(1-3 years) 
   0.002*** 0.001 
    (0.0001) (0.001) 
Husband’s income share x  AD    0.017*** 0.018*** 
    (0.0001) (0.001) 
Observations 56180 56180 56180 56180 56180 
Individuals 2993 2993 2993 2993 2993 
Mean (SD) of Dependent Variable 0.585 0.585 0.585 0.585 0.585 
 (2.126) (2.126) (2.126) (2.126) (2.126) 
  1.747 1.747 1.747 1.747 1.747 
NOTEs: Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered at the individual level. BD = 1 if respondent is married and within 3 years of 
marital dissolution, and AD = 1 if respondent has experience marital dissolution as of the respondent’s interview date.  Unreported controls 
include the state unemployment rate, number of children, binary variable indicating the presence of a child less than age 1, state-year fixed 
effects, and individual fixed effects.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A1.1.—Distributions of Months Enrolled 
 Intact 
Sample 
 Separated Sample 
Months Enrolled   All Before 
Dissolution 
After 
Dissolution 
1 4.9  4.21 3.48 4.96 
2 5.75  6.95 6.77 7.14 
3 8.71  8.72 9.86 7.54 
4 23.25  25.07 24.76 25.4 
5 18.26  16.85 15.09 18.65 
6 6.47  5.39 5.22 5.56 
7 4.86  6.17 6.96 5.36 
8 4.44  4.7 5.22 4.17 
9 6.34  5.88 7.35 4.37 
10 5.79  5.48 6.58 4.37 
11 2.03  2.94 2.9 2.98 
12 
9.21 
 
7.64 5.8 9.52 
Observations  (% of 
sample) 
2366 (9.6)  1021 (11.2) 517 (10.8) 504 (11.5) 
NOTE: The Intact Sample is comprised of women who were observed for at least 4 survey rounds 
and who did not experience marital dissolution.  The Separated Sample consists of women who 
were observed married with complete data for at least 3 survey rounds before divorce and who 
were observed for at least 1 survey round after divorce.   
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Table A1.2.—Enrollment Rate and Average Months Enrolled of Separated 
Sample 
 
Separated Sample 
 
Year relative to 
dissolution 
Enrollment 
Rate 
Average 
Months 
Enrolled N 
Intact Average 
Months Enrolled 
-8 0.090 0.438 570 0.447 
-7 0.101 0.547 642 0.462 
-6 0.091 0.515 765 0.434 
-5 0.114 0.620 876 0.439 
-4 0.102 0.526 1012 0.454 
-3 0.101 0.508 1102 0.464 
-2 0.097 0.529 1102 0.443 
-1 0.089 0.457 1080 0.416 
0 0.080 0.390 1118 0.410 
1 0.080 0.394 1127 0.383 
2 0.088 0.441 1111 0.380 
3 0.093 0.452 1085 0.367 
4 0.090 0.484 1048 0.364 
5 0.093 0.513 1022 0.357 
6 0.082 0.515 936 0.363 
7 0.090 0.530 925 0.357 
8 0.083 0.467 858 0.370 
9 0.074 0.424 813 0.356 
10 0.085 0.499 792 0.357 
NOTE: The Intact Sample is comprised of women who were observed for at least 4 survey rounds 
with while married and who did not experience marital dissolution.  The Separated Sample consists of 
women who were observed married with complete data for at least 3 survey rounds before divorce 
and who were observed for at least 1 survey round after divorce.   
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   Figure A1.1-- Women’s average weeks worked relative to year of dissolution. The Intact Sample is comprised of 
wo men who were observed for at least 4 survey rounds while married and who did not experience marital 
dissolution.  The Separated Sample consists of women who were observed married with complete data for at least 3 
survey rounds before divorce and who were observed for at least 1 survey round after divorce.  The vertical line 
marks the year when the divorce is initiated.   
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   Figure A1.2.--Women’s propensity to receive financial aid.  Percentages are based on sample who reported 
attending college in the previous year. The Intact Sample is comprised of women who were observed for at least 4 
survey rounds while married and who did not experience marital dissolution.  The Separated Sample consists of 
women who were observed married with complete data for at least 3 survey rounds before divorce and who were 
observed for at least 1 survey round after divorce.  The vertical line marks the year when divorce is initiated.   
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Table A1.3.  Fixed Effects Estimates of the Impact of Marital Dissolution 
on Women’s School Investment 
   
 School Participation Number of Months 
Enrolled 
Variable (1) (2) 
Age -0.018** -0.150** 
 (0.008) (0.058) 
Age, Squared 0.0005** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
School Wage Premium 0.191*** 1.633*** 
 (0.027) (0.210) 
Total Children -0.015*** -0.097*** 
 (0.003) (0.022) 
Presence of child age less 
than 1 -0.050*** -0.368*** 
 (0.004) (0.031) 
   
   
Observations                56180              56180 
Individuals                 2993                 2993 
Mean (SD) of Dependent 
Variable  
0.091 0.585 
 (0.287) (2.126) 
 0.279 0.283 
F-test   0.792 0.529 
Models include state-specific year and individual fixed effects.  All standard 
errors are clustered at the individual level and are shown in parentheses. The 
analysis sample includes the Intact Sample and observations with relative years 
to divorce less than 10.  Relative year   -1 is excluded to make all estimates 
relative to the year prior to dissolution.   
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Table A1.4.  Fixed Effects Estimates of the Impact of Marital 
Dissolution on Women’s School Investment 
 School 
Participation 
Number of 
Months 
Enrolled 
Relative Years to Marital 
Dissolution 
(1) (2) 
-5 years 0.001 0.057 
 (0.011) (0.079) 
-4 years -0.006 0.009 
 (0.010) (0.074) 
-3 years -0.003 -0.027 
 (0.010) (0.068) 
-2 years 0.007 0.065 
 (0.010) (0.074) 
0 years 0.001 0.001 
 (0.010) (0.072) 
1 year 0.005 -0.047 
 (0.011) (0.077) 
2 years 0.010 0.043 
 (0.011) (0.086) 
3 years 0.025** 0.164* 
 (0.012) (0.091) 
4 years 0.034*** 0.237** 
 (0.012) (0.094) 
5 years 0.032** 0.239** 
 (0.013) (0.099) 
6 years 0.032** 0.277*** 
 (0.013) (0.103) 
7 years 0.026** 0.261** 
 (0.013) (0.103) 
8 years 0.020 0.159 
 (0.013) (0.099) 
9 years 0.016 0.148 
 (0.013) (0.100) 
10 years 0.021 0.188* 
 (0.013) (0.108) 
Observations 56180 56180 
Individuals 2993 2993 
Mean (SD) of Dependent 
Variable  
0.091 0.585 
 (0.287) (2.126) 
 0.279 0.283 
F-test   0.792 0.529 
NOTE.--Regressions control for age, age squared, number of 
children, an indicator for presence of child under age 1, a measure of 
the wage premium, and state-specific year and individual fixed 
effects.  All standard errors are clustered at the individual level and 
are shown in parentheses. The analysis sample includes the Intact 
Sample and observations with relative years to divorce less than 10.  
Relative year -1 is excluded to make all estimates relative to the year 
prior to dissolution.   
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Table A1.5.  Fixed Effects Estimates of the 
Impact of Marital  Dissolution on Highest 
Grade Completed Relative Years to 
Dissolution 
  
-5 years 0.007  
 (0.024)  
-4 years 0.025  
 (0.023)  
-3 years 0.021  
 (0.024)  
-2 years 0.023  
 (0.024)  
0 years 0.030  
 (0.028)  
1 year 0.038  
 (0.030)  
2 years 0.049  
 (0.033)  
3 years 0.040  
 (0.032)  
4 years 0.052  
 (0.033)  
5 years 0.055  
 (0.036)  
6 years 0.066*  
 (0.037)  
7 years 0.068*  
 (0.039)  
8 years 0.077*  
 (0.041)  
9 years 0.099**  
 (0.043)  
10 years 0.141***  
 (0.046)  
Observations           56180  
Individuals             2993  
Mean (SD) of 
Dependent Variable  
13.232  
 (2.47)  
 0.964  
F-test  
 
0.595  
NOTE.--The dependent variable is number of 
years of education.  Regressions control for age, 
age squared, number of children, an indicator for 
presence of child under age 1, a measure of the 
wage premium, and state-specific year and 
individual fixed effects. All standard errors are 
clustered at the individual level and are shown in 
parentheses. The analysis sample includes the 
Intact Sample and observations with relative years 
to divorce less than 10.  Relative year -1 is 
excluded to make all estimates relative to the year 
prior to dissolution.   
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Table A1.6.  Fixed Effects Estimates of the Impact of Marital 
Dissolution on Number of Months Enrolled in School 
 Intact and 
Separated 
Intact Separated 
Relative Years to 
Marital Dissolution 
(1) (2) (3) 
-5 years 0.057 0.003 0.042 
 (0.079) (0.099) (0.081) 
-4 years 0.009 -0.066 -0.028 
 (0.074) (0.086) (0.076) 
-3 years -0.027 -0.092 -0.07 
 (0.068) (0.072) (0.069) 
-2 years 0.065 -0.002 0.024 
 (0.074) (0.058) (0.072) 
0 years 0.001 -0.075 -0.039 
 (0.072) (0.059) (0.082) 
1 year -0.047 -0.114 -0.099 
 (0.077) (0.073) (0.095) 
2 years 0.043 -0.024 0.017 
 (0.086) (0.087) (0.110) 
3 years 0.164* 0.112 0.126 
 (0.091) (0.092) (0.120) 
4 years 0.237** 0.184* 0.170 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.127) 
5 years 0.239** 0.185* 0.178 
 (0.099) (0.098) (0.139) 
6 years 0.277*** 0.209** 0.192 
 (0.103) (0.102) (0.147) 
7 years 0.261** 0.195* 0.186 
 (0.103) (0.108) (0.156) 
8 years 0.159 0.099 0.072 
 (0.099) (0.104) (0.160) 
9 years 0.148 0.086 0.056 
 (0.100) (0.103) (0.168) 
10 years 0.188* 0.117 0.076 
 (0.108) (0.111) (0.180) 
Observations            56180       50100      22491 
Individuals              2993         2993        1280 
Mean (SD) of 
Dependent Variable  
0.585 0.575 0.643 
 (2.126) (2.114) (2.223) 
 0.283 0.303 0.322 
F-test  
 
0.529 0.543 0.458 
NOTE.--Regressions control for age, age squared, number of children, 
an indicator for presence of child under age 1, a measure of the wage 
premium, and state-specific year and individual fixed effects.  All 
standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are shown in 
parentheses. The analysis sample includes the Intact Sample and 
observations with relative years to divorce less than 10.  Relative year 
-1 is excluded to make all estimates relative to the year prior to 
dissolution.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
I.  Introduction 
An important issue underlying recent social policy debates has been the extent to which 
providing for low-income children is the responsibility of parents or the public.  The relevance of 
this question is underscored by the large differences across family types in the poverty rate.  In 
the United States in 2009, about 70 percent of children living with a single mother were poor or 
low income, compared to 32 percent of children living in other types of families (Mather, 
2010).
18
  Policy efforts to mitigate the high poverty rate among single-mother families include 
defining and enforcing child support obligations as well as providing income support through an 
assortment of government-funded welfare programs including Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF), Food Stamps, and the Earned Income Tax Credit.  However, with the passage 
of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, 
single mothers have been expected to rely less on public assistance and more on their own 
capacity to earn income as well as transfers from the noncustodial parent.   
 Economic theory suggests that child support reform may both reduce public welfare 
expenditures and improve work incentives of poor single mothers.  In the canonical static model 
of labor supply, the development of public assistance programs leads to a reduction in labor 
supply unambiguously among the eligible population because of the high benefit reduction or 
implicit tax rate (Burtless and Hausman, 1978; Moffit, 1983, 1986).  The high implicit tax rate of 
the TANF program implies that a woman on welfare earning an extra dollar of income can 
typically expect her post-welfare income to rise by a small fraction of the extra dollar.   
                                               
18
 Families are characterized as poor if their total income is less than 100 percent of the official poverty threshold 
and “low income” if income is less than 200 percent of the poverty threshold. 
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However, because the benefit reduction rate creates a nonlinear budget constraint for eligible 
recipients, an increase in nonwage income does not necessarily reduce hours work (Moffit, 
1986).  More specifically, if child support income is sufficiently high to keep a woman off 
welfare, her earnings are not implicitly taxed at such high rates (Hu, 1999).  Thus, reforms to 
increase child support receipt are particularly desirable because it may both reduce public 
welfare expenditures and increase labor supply of single mothers.  Thus, it is important to 
identify whether child support income has a causal effect on the decision to work. 
Many previous studies have documented the positive association between child support 
and child well-being indicators, such as educational attainment, schooling, and cognitive 
outcomes (Baydor and Brooks-Gunn 1994; Graham, Beller, and Hernandez 1994; Knox and 
Bane, 1994; Knox, 1996; Argys et al., 1998), but the positive association between child support 
receipt and the labor supply of single-mothers mothers has received less attention.
19
  Earlier 
studies (e.g., Beller and Graham, 1985; O’Neil, 1985, Robins and Dickinson, 1985) use  multiple 
regression techniques to examine the relationship between child support receipt and women’s 
labor supply and show that women with child support are more likely to work and work longer 
hours than women without it.  However, estimates from earlier studies measure the correlation of 
child support receipt with, not the causal effect of child support receipt on, women’s labor 
supply.  The correlation is an overestimate of the causal effect if, for example, men are more 
willing to pay child support to women who possess characteristics that are associated with a 
greater desire to work in the formal labor market (which is unlikely to be observed the 
econometrician).  Conversely, the correlation is an underestimate of the causal effect if women 
who receive child support possess unobserved characteristics that are associated with a greater 
                                               
19
 Grossman and Hayghe (1982) were the first to document the positive correlation between the receipt of child 
support income and labor supply. 
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desire to work at home.  Several studies have accounted for the possibility that child support 
receipt and women’s labor supply are jointly determined (See Graham and Beller 1989, Graham 
1990, and Hu, 1999) but focus only on divorced/separated mothers, and the group of mothers 
with non-marital births is likely to be very different. 
This paper paper builds on previous research by examining the relationship between the 
labor supply of previously-married and never-married single mothers and child support receipt.  
Endogeneity of child support receipt is addressed by estimating instrumental variables models, 
where child support policy variables are used as instruments.  Specifically, I argue that the ratio 
of child support enforcement (CSE) collections to administrative expenditures is a valid 
instrument for child support income levels, and I use variation within states over time to identify 
the effect of child support income on paid employment.  Further, I show that the instrument is a 
strong predictor of child support income for previously-married single mothers, but not for 
never-married single mothers.  Consequently, I estimate IV models using only the sample of 
previously-married single mothers.       
My main findings show a sizable positive relationship between child support income and 
paid employment for previously married mothers:  a $1,000 increase in child support income 
increases the likelihood of paid employment by 6.7 percentage points, or 8.1 percent.  These 
estimates are the strongest for previously married single mothers with an education level of high 
school diploma or less, for whom a $1,000 increase in child support income leads to a 18.2 
percentage point increase in the probability of paid employment 
The central finding of this analysis is that an increase in child support income has a 
positive effect on the employment status of previously-married single mothers.  Moreover, the 
positive impact of an increase in child support income is largest for previously-married single 
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mothers with relatively low education levels, an economically disadvantaged population.  This 
result has important policy implications in light of the 2006 TANF reauthorization bill that 
includes a provision to allow single-mother families to receive both child support and TANF, 
which may increase the probability that noncustodial fathers pay support.  My estimates imply 
that policies that are successful at increasing the amount of child support received by single 
mothers will have a positive effect on their labor supply.   
 
II.  History of Child Support Enforcement 
The goal of child support is to mitigate the economic loss that children face as a result of living 
with just one parent.   Prior to 1975, child-support enforcement was managed largely by family 
law in each state and enforced by the court system, while the federal government limited its child 
support efforts to children receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children who were 
abandoned by one of her parents.  Consequently, during this period, any family that wanted to 
receive child support had to hire an attorney and go to court.  During this period, the court 
decided the amount of child support to be paid by the noncustodial parent on an individualized 
basis.  Once the amount of support was decided, the noncustodial parent paid the support directly 
to the parent caring for the children.   
In 1975, Congress added Part D to Title IV of the Social Security Act, establishing the 
Child Support Enforcement (IV-D) program.  This legislation created the public system to 
enforce child support obligations.  As part of legislation enacted in 1984, states were required to 
adopt expedited procedures for obtaining support orders either through the judicial system or in 
an administrative agency.  In an effort to increase the number of awards to never-married 
mothers, states were required to extend the period during which paternity establishment can be 
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initiated to any time up to the child’s eighteenth birthday.  Further, in an attempt to ensure award 
levels are consistent, states were required to establish by October 1987 child support guidelines 
to enable judges and others determining the sizes of awards to set equitable and adequate support 
payments—though, at the time, these guidelines were not binding on the judiciary.20  Moreover, 
the amendments mandated that all states adopt automatic income withholding for child support 
to take effect after one month’s delinquency.  Wage withholding was then greatly expanded with 
the passing of the Family Support Act of 1988 by requiring immediate wage withholding to 
begin by November 1990 for all new or modified orders being enforced by the states.  Most 
federal reforms have been extended to the private system, though it is still judicially based and 
complaint-driven (Sorensen and Hill, 2004).
21
  
To this day, congress has never required families who are not on welfare to use the IV-D 
program.  Nevertheless, the IV-D program must accommodate anyone who requests services.  In 
contrast, welfare families are required to participate in this program and assign their rights to 
child support to the government as a prerequisite to receiving aid.  Prior to 1984, any child 
support collected on behalf of welfare families was kept by the government and used to negate 
the costs of providing welfare to the family.  These obligations of welfare recipients reflect the 
original goal of the IV-D program, which was to recover welfare costs. 
Although using the collections of welfare recipients to offset administrative costs (what is 
termed “zero disregard”) was considered cost effective, the policy had some major 
disadvantages.  For example, why should custodial parents cooperate with the child support 
                                               
20
 However, the Family Support Act of 1988 required states pass legislation making state child support guidelines a 
rebuttable presumption in any judicial or administrative proceeding and establishing the child support order that is 
established from the state guidelines the correct amount to be rewarded. 
21
 For example, states were required, with some exceptions, to implement immediate wage withholding in all 
support orders first issued on or after January 1, 1994, regardless of whether the parent applied for child support 
services. 
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system if the support paid did not benefit them?  Moreover, why should noncustodial parents pay 
formal child support if their children are not going to receive the money?  With these concerns in 
mind, legislation enacted in 1984 required that the first $50 per month of current child support 
collected would go to the family, with the remainder retained by the government. 
In 1996, there was another wave of child support reforms when PRWORA dramatically 
changed the nature of the welfare system by replacing AFDC with TANF.  Perhaps most notable 
for this study, PRWORA abolished the requirement for a $50 per month disregard of child 
support and allowed states ample flexibility in determining how to handle child support paid on 
behalf of families receiving TANF.  A majority of states now keep all child support paid on 
behalf of TANF families, whereas most of the remaining states continue to have a $50 per month 
disregard (Justice, 2007).  As a consequence, mothers who receive welfare in a post-PRWORA 
environment, as is the case in this paper, have less of an incentive to corporate with child support 
officials than single mothers on welfare in the pre-PRWORA era.
22
  There is some evidence that 
changing the disregard policy has the largest effect on never married mothers.  For example, 
Sorensen and Hill (2004) find some evidence that never-married mothers have benefitted from 
the $50 pass-through, which was rescinded in 1996.  More recently, Cancian, Meyer,and Casper 
(2008) find that when custodial parents keep all child support paid on their behalf, paternity 
establishment occurs more quickly, noncustodial fathers are more likely to support, and custodial 
families receive more income.    
                                               
22
 Federal law requires applicants for, and recipients of TANF assign their rights to the state in order to receive 
benefits.  In addition, each applicant or recipient must cooperate with the State to establish paternity of a child born 
outside of marriage and to collect child support payments.  However, many states still allow mothers to simply attest 
to a lack of information about the father, and all states have a "good cause" exemption to protect mothers who may 
suffer injury from cooperation due to factors violence. Finally, states generally allow mothers who have not 
identified the father to do so as circumstances change (Turetsky 1998; Roberts 2000; Roff 2010). 
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Under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, states are mandated to provide child services 
such as facilitating paternity establishment, locating absent parents, establishing child-support 
orders, and enforcing and adjusting child-support orders.  As previously discussed, I use two-
state level measures to indicate a state’s relative effectiveness in these practices.  First, I measure 
the average amount of administrative expenditures by the Child Support Enforcement office per 
single woman age 15 to 44.  To measure the effectiveness of these expenditures, I include the 
ratio of the amount of child-support collections by the CSE office to the amount of 
administrative expenditures.  Summary statistics for these measures are reported in Appendix 
Table 2.2.1 for the full sample, and by child support receipt and marital status (For a detailed 
description of these two variables, see Argys and Peters, 2003).
23
 
 
III. The Effect of Child Support on Labor Supply 
Economic theory predicts that changes in the level of child support income can influence 
the labor supply behavior of single mothers, where the predicted effect largely depends on the 
welfare status of the single mother.  The standard consumption-leisure diagram is a convenient 
tool to demonstrate the influence of an increase in child support income on women’s decisions 
regarding welfare and work.  To illustrate the effects of interest, it is assumed the woman has a 
well-behaved preference function over leisure and consumption. 
Following the theoretical exposition of Hu (1999), figure 2.1 shows the effects on an 
increase in child support income on a single mother’s budget constraint.  For simplicity, the 
woman is assumed to have no nonlabor income initially and the TANF earnings disregards for 
work expenses and child care are ignored.  In the absence of TANF, her opportunities are 
                                               
23
 Argys and Peters (2003) measure the average amount of administrative expenditures by the CSE office made on 
behalf of each family in the CSE caseload.  As a result, the measure in their paper utilizes a different denominator 
than in this study.   
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represented by line OBX, the slope of which is equal to minus the wage rate.  The TANF budget 
constraint is represented by OGBX.  The length of OG is the guarantee level and point B is the 
break-even point.  The slope between O and B is , where  is the TANF benefit 
reduction rate.  Suppose the woman receives an increase in child support payment equal to the 
length of , so that the new budget constraint is .  The woman who is initially at Point G, 
on welfare and working zero hours, will jump discontinuously from point G to Point 2 if the 
child support payments are large enough.  For such a woman, child support income has three 
effects:  it increase her income opportunities, leads her to leave the welfare rolls, and induces her 
to start working in the labor market.  A woman who initially works positive hours and receives 
TANF benefits starts at point 2.  This woman can increase her total income without changing her 
work hours because the new budget constraint lies above the TANF budget constraint at those 
hours of work.  However, the increase in her effective wage rate induces substitution away from 
leisure, so that the woman may choose to increase her hours of work to Point 2, depending on the 
sizes of the income and substitution effects.  Like the case in which a woman moves from Point 
G to Point 1, this increase in hours of work is simultaneous with the woman’s exit from the 
TANF program.  For single mothers who do not receive welfare, standard theory predicts that an 
increase in child support income would have a negative effect on labor supply.  
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 Although economic models lend theoretically ambiguous predictions, empirical evidence 
tend to show a positive association between child support income and labor supply of single 
mothers .  For example, evidence from NLSY 1988 data suggests custodial mothers who 
received child support were more likely to be in the labor market and to work longer hours 
compared to mothers who did not receive child support (Veum, 1992).  This study also finds that 
custodial mothers who received child support have higher educational attainment and wages 
compared to those who received no support, which suggests women who do and do not receive 
child support are likely to differ from each other in ways that are correlated with support receipt 
and labor supply and that are unobserved by the econometrician.  In other words, child support 
receipt may be endogenous.   
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 Several studies have extended earlier work by accounting for endogeneity problems, but 
the results have been mixed.  These studies have examined the effects of child support payments 
on the labor supply of previously married mothers only (Graham and Beller, 1989; Hu, 1999).  
The dependent variables were typically welfare participation, labor force participation, and hours 
of work.  Graham and Beller (1989) use data from a sample of divorced or separated women in 
the 1979 and 1982 March/April Match files of the Current Population Survey (CPS) to examine 
the relationship between hours worked and child support. They address the endogeneity of child 
support income by using and instrumental variable approach and find evidence that child support 
income deters hours of work, but that the effect is modest.  For example, they find that a $1,000 
increase in child support income reduces work by just two hours per year.  Graham (1990), using 
the 1979 and 1982 March/April CPS, restricts the sample to women due child support awards 
and finds that a $1000 increase in child support income reduces the labor supply of single 
mothers by 54 hours.  Hu (1999) extends the previous studies by using an instrumental variables 
procedure that incorporates child support policy measures that vary across state and time.  Using 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Hu finds evidence that an increase in child support income 
would lead to a modest increase in the proportion of divorced/separated mothers who work.  
Garfinkel, Heintze, and Huang (2001) examine the effect of child support income on the income 
of single mothers by using child support expenditures per single mother and a legislative index 
which accounts for the probability of receiving a formal obligation, the level of the obligation, 
and the probability of receiving the full obligation.  Using the CPS from1979–1999, they find 
that the income of single mothers increased by two dollars for each dollar of child support 
received.  Differences in sample composition could be the reasons why the effect of child 
support on mother’s labor supply is unclear.  Theory predicts the effect of child support income 
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will differ by welfare status of the single mothers, yet the previous studies did not split samples 
by welfare status or eligibility.  Consequently, examining the effect of child support income on 
the labor supply of a disadvantaged sample may yield different results than when analyzing a 
more advantaged sample.  To examine how the labor supply effects of child support income 
differ by welfare status, this study will present results by education level under the assumption 
that single mothers with lower levels of education are more likely than their counterparts with 
more education to be on welfare.  It follows that the effect of child support income on the labor 
supply of single mothers with relatively lower levels of education is expected to be nonnegative 
while the effect on single mothers with higher education levels is expected to be negative.  
 
IV. Empirical Methodology 
 
A.  Empirical Model 
 
The central difficulty in identifying how variation in child support income affects employment 
decisions is that child support income is not randomly assigned across female-headed 
households:  unobserved factors that affect a woman’s propensity to work may be correlated with 
the amount of child support she receives.  I attempt to overcome this problem by using a measure 
of child support enforcement that varies across state and over time to generate exogenous 
variation in child support income.  Specifically, I measure child support enforcement as the ratio 
of child support collections to child support enforcement (CSE) administrative expenditures.  
Measuring child support enforcement as a ratio of child collections to CSE administrative 
expenditures is an improvement over prior measures because this measure encompasses not only 
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the interaction of the strength of child support laws and effort to enforce the laws but also the 
efficacy of state practices in implementing laws.  For example, a state may be a leader in passing 
child support legislation, but its laws may not be enforced.  Expenditures may be a good measure 
of a state’s commitment to enforcement, but states with the worst collection rates may need to 
spend more to improve their outcomes.  Moreover, past studies have shown that child support 
awards and receipt are more likely in states with high ratios of CSE collections to expenditures 
(Peters et.al, 2004).  Therefore, I estimate the following model, instrumenting child support 
income with the ratio of the amount of child support collections by the CSE office to the amount 
of administrative: 
 
 where  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if individual  had a paid job during the reference 
period and  refers to child support income.  The model also includes a vector of individual 
characteristics as well as state labor market measures .   Finally, I include state fixed effects 
(  and year fixed effects ( .   
  The motivation for instrumenting child support income with child support policy 
measures is two-fold.  First, child support income level is likely endogenous because child 
support income is not randomly assigned among all eligible recipients.  In other words, I am 
concerned about the presence of unmeasured attributes associated with the level of child support 
income that also partially determine decisions related to human capital investment.  For example, 
women who desire to work at home may pursue child support receipt more aggressively than 
women who have less of a desire to specialize in home production, imparting a negative 
correlation between the error term and the level of child support income.  Second, within-state 
variation in child support policy measures are an arguably exogenous source of child support 
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variation.  Using child support policy measures in the year of their first child’s birth for never-
married single mothers or the year of separation for previously-married single mothers as an 
instrument for child support income levels allows me to identify  in equation (1) under the 
conditions that child support policy measures provide a significant source of child support 
income variation and that this child support income variation is exogenous, i.e., is uncorrelated 
with the error term conditional on the observables in the model. 
One important factor that would cause child support policy variables to be endogenous is 
the existence of unobserved state characteristics that are correlated with both the employment of 
single mothers and child support income levels, the most likely of which is the generosity of the 
state’s welfare programs.  For example, if states that have less generous welfare programs tend to 
have higher levels of employment among single mothers and greater levels of child support 
enforcement, I may find spuriously positive results.  
Equation (1) contains several controls for such selection. I control for the maximum level 
of Temporary Assistance to Needy Family (TANF) benefits for a single mother with 3 children 
to capture the generosity of the state’s welfare programs.  I also include state –level fixed effects, 
to proxy for differences in welfare generosity across states.   
Conditional on these controls, the child support income variation I use to identify 
equation (1) comes from several sources.  First, there is a strong time- and area-specific 
component to child support policy variables.  For example, the ratio of CSE collections to 
administrative expenditures in New York increased from 3.39 in 1994 to 4.76 in 2001.  In 
contrast, in Maryland, the ratio of CSE collections to administrative expenditures decreased 
during the same period from 4.71 to 3.91.  Thus, this state-level variation incorporates both 
differences in within-state measures of child support policy variables over time and differences 
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across states in a given year in the magnitude of the child support policy variable.  This source of 
variation is ideal because it allows one to compare employment decisions of single-mothers with 
the same observable characteristics but who experience different child support income levels 
based on their location and the timing of becoming eligible to receive child support.   
The final potential identification concern with equation (1) is that both child support 
policy measures and employment may be correlated with local labor market conditions.  It is 
conceivable that labor demand shocks could increase the ratio of child support collections to 
expenditures by increasing child support transfers due to an increase in the employment of 
noncustodial fathers.  If local labor demand shocks increase the ratio of child support collections 
per administrative expenditures and increase employment rates, my estimates of   will be 
biased upward due to this spurious correlation.  To mitigate this concern, I control directly for 
yearly variation in unemployment rates and real income per capita.  In Section #, I also estimate 
the model only for childless single women, who experience the local macroeconomic 
fluctuations but not the financial gains from child support income increases.  I find childless 
single women do not respond to changes in child support policy variables, which suggests my 
estimates are not being biased by unobserved concomitant macroeconomic shocks. 
Throughout the analysis, I estimate separate models for never-married mother and 
previously married mothers because the process of establishing child support are different for 
these populations.  For example, a never-married mother must legally establish paternity of her 
children prior to child support being awarded.  For previously married mothers, paternity is not 
an issue.  Nevertheless, estimating separate models for previously married and never-married 
mothers assumes that the child support enforcement variables do not affect the decision to 
divorce or have a child outside of marriage (Sorensen and Hill, 2004).  Yet previous studies 
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providence evidence that child support enforcement reduces divorce (Nixon 1997) and reduces 
nonmarital childbearing (Plotnick et al., 1999).  Therefore, if women who are deterred from 
nonmarital childbearing or divorce are more responsive to these policies than other women, then 
the IV estimates of the effect of child support receipt are biased downward. 
 
V.  Data 
 
The individual-level data in this analysis come from the 1996, 2001, and 2004 panels of the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).  Each panel of SIPP includes a nationally 
representative sample ranging from 40,000 to 51,000 households, where each household is 
interview every 4 months.  In both the 1996 and 2004 panels, interviews span a period of 4 years.  
For the 2001 panel, interviews span a period of 3 years.  These data are particularly suited to 
address the central research question in this paper because they contain information on 
employment, school enrollment, child support arrangements, and a rich set of demographic 
characteristics.  Each interview (or wave) gathers core labor force, income, household and family 
composition, and program participation data.  In contrast, topical questions are not repeated in 
each interview and are designed to gather specific information on a wide variety of subjects.  
 Most of the data used in this paper come from the child support topical module (wave 5).  
This module identifies women who are eligible to receive child support and asks detailed 
questions about the characteristics of the child support agreement.  Specifically, the survey asks 
about the type of agreement, frequency of payments and annual amount.  The survey also asks 
about other forms of financial assistance, such as provisions for health care costs, which are not 
employed in this analysis.   
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 The sample used in this analysis is single women who are eligible to receive child 
support.  Women who are 15 years old or older and are biological or adoptive parents of children 
less than 21 years old whose other parent is not in the household are considered eligible to 
receive child support.  The analysis focuses on single mothers, and does not include married 
women who are eligible for child support, because this group is more likely than married women 
to be on public assistance.
24
 
Characteristics of the analysis sample are presented in first column of Appendix Table 
2.1.  Most of the variables are measured during the child support module.
25
  Slightly fewer 40 
percent of the sample received child support during the previous 12 months.  The average 
respondent has slightly fewer than two children who are eligible to receive child support and for 
16 percent sample the age of the youngest child is less than five years of age.  In regards to race, 
32 percent of the sample is black and 16 percent is Hispanic.  About 65 percent of the mothers 
have been previously married.  Only 19 percent of the sample has a bachelor’s degree or more 
while 19 percent have not obtained a high school diploma.  
Columns 2 and 3 report means by child support status for the full sample.  In general, 
respondents who have received child support appear less disadvantaged than respondents who 
have not received child support.  For example, 70 percent of respondents who have received 
child support were previously married as compared to only 47 percent of the respondents who 
have not received child support.  Respondents who have not received child support are also less 
                                               
24
 I begin with a sample of 9201 single women who are 15 years old or older and are biological or adoptive parents 
less than children less than 21 year old whose other parent is not in the household.  Exclusions from the sample are 
made if the mother was not in the sample or did not interview during wave 2 (927).  During the wave 2 interview, 
respondents are asked questions about their migration history such as their place of birth, where they lived, and how 
long they lived there.  Obtaining information pertaining to migration history is vital to merging child support 
enforcement data.  Further, I exclude an additional 521 mothers for whom information on child support enforcement 
is unavailable.  The resulting analysis sample includes 7,843 mothers. 
25
 The age of the youngest child was collected from the fertility topical module, which is conducted during wave 2.  
The respondent’s education is from wave 4. 
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likely to have obtained at least a high school diploma than respondents who received child 
support.   Most notably, respondents who received child support are 17 percent more likely to 
have had paid employment during the reference period (previous 4 months) than respondents 
who have not received child support.   
I also report means by marital status.  Not surprisingly, never-married respondents are 
less likely to receive child support than previously married respondents.  Previously married 
mothers are 84 percent more likely than never-married mothers to receive some child support.  
Among respondents who report receiving child support, the average amount received for never-
married mothers and previously married mothers is approximately $1,840 and $3,290, 
respectively.  For both groups, child support receipt and employment are positively correlated.  
Never-married (previously married) mothers who received child support are 18 (10) percent 
more likely to be employed than then never-married (previously married) who did not receive 
child support.   
To address the possible endogeneity of the level of child support income and employment 
status, child support policy measures likely to affect the level of child support but not 
employment status directly are used as instrumental variables.  To link the respondent-level data 
with state-level policy variables, I use the migration history data to identify the state of residence 
at the time of separation and at the time of the birth of their first child for previously married and 
never-married mothers, respectively.  For the full sample and samples stratified by marital status, 
child support receipt is associated with a higher level of CSE collections per administrative 
expenditures.  Interestingly, child support receipt is also negatively associated with the state 
unemployment level.  Thus, the positive relationship between child support policy variables and 
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child support receipt could be the result of local labor market shocks.  This underscores the 
importance of controlling for state-level unemployment and real income per capita in all models. 
 
VI. Results  
A.  Estimates by Marital Status  
2.1 presents OLS estimates of equation (1) using the SIPP data described in Section # for the 
1996, 2001, and 2004 panels.  In the first column, I present OLS estimates of the relationship 
between child support income levels and paid employment.  Conditional on the demographic 
controls in the model, child support income levels are only modestly associated with the 
probability of paid employment:  a $1000 increase in child support income is associated with a 
0.84 of a percentage point change in the likelihood of paid employment.  
 In the next two columns of Table 2.1, I present OLS estimates of the relationship between 
child support income levels and paid employment by previous marital status.  In column (2), I 
find that a $1,000 change in child support income leads to 1.7 of a percentage point change in the 
likelihood of paid employment for never-married mothers.  For previously married mothers, a 
$1,000 increase in child support income is associated with a 0.71 percentage point increase in the 
probability of paid employment.  There is reason to believe that these estimates are biased, 
however, if both the probability of paid employment and child support income level are, in part, 
determined by unobservable characteristics of the mothers.  
 In Table 2.2, I instrument child support income levels with the natural log of CSE 
collections per administrative expenditures.  In column (1), I find that when the CSE 
effectiveness measure is used as an instrument for child support income level, a $1,000 change in 
child support income leads to a 5.4 percentage point change in the likelihood of paid 
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employment.  However, this estimate is not statistically distinguishable from zero at any 
conventional level.  For never-married mothers, the bottom of column (2) shows that natural log 
of CSE collections per expenditure is not strongly associated with child support income levels.  
For previously married mothers, the second stage estimates in column (3) show that a $1,000 
increase in child support income increases the likelihood of paid employment by 6.7 percentage 
points, which is statistically distinguishable from zero at the 10% level.  These estimates are 
suggestive that, for previously married mothers, an increase in child support income increases 
the probability of paid employment. 
 
B. Sample Stratified by Education 
The results thus far have demonstrated a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between child support income and paid employment of previously married single mothers.  I 
now turn to an analysis of whether these effects are larger or small for those with lower levels of 
education.  Understanding how child support income variation influences labor supply across the 
education distribution is important because single mothers with less education tend to have less 
attachment to the labor market.  So, to the extent this group is highly responsive, it points to one 
source of variation that can induce those with less education to obtain employment. 
 Table 2.3 shows IV estimates of equation (1) for the sample of previously married single 
mothers by different education levels, using the natural log of CSE collections per administrative 
expenditures as an instrument for child support income.  The estimates in Table 2.3 show strong 
evidence that the effects in Table 2.2 are being identified off of single mothers with relatively 
less education.  For single mothers with a high school diploma or less education, a $1,000 
change in child support income leads to a 18.2 percentage point increase in the likelihood of paid 
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employment.  This estimate is statistically different from zero at the 5% level.  The employment 
rate for previously married single mothers with an education level of high school diploma or less 
is 47.8%, implying a 38.1 percent increase in the employment probability from a $1,000 increase 
in child support income for this group.  Thus, for single mothers with an education level of high 
school or less, an increase in child support income has a large, positive effect on paid 
employment.  For the other education groups, the estimated effect of child support income is 
statistically insignificant at conventional levels, as shown in columns (2) and (3) in Table 2.3.  
There are several explanations for why the employment status of previously married 
single mothers with at least some college is less sensitive to child support income.  For instance, 
these women may find it easier than their less educated counterparts to find jobs that pay enough 
for them to cover the high cost of child care.  Thus, for less educated single mothers, child 
support income levels may help cover the fixed costs of employment.  Another  possible 
explanation is the fact that higher educated single mothers are less likely than less educated 
single mothers to receive TANF.  For less educated single mothers, an increase in child support 
income may render paid employment more attractive than welfare participation.  It therefore is 
not surprising that higher education single mothers would exhibit less sensitivity of employment 
to child support income variation. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
This paper uses data from the SIPP on single mothers in Panels 1996, 2001, and 2004 to 
investigate the relationship between child support income and the labor supply of single mothers.  
OLS estimates, which fail to adjust for the endogeneity of child support income, show a positive 
and significant correlation between child support income and the probability of paid 
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employment.  Further, the positive association remains even after controlling for an extensive set 
of individual and state-level characteristics.  Even when analyzing various subgroups, the OLS 
estimate remains positive and significant. 
 Do changes in child support income have a causal effect on the labor supply of single 
mothers?  OLS estimates do not provide the answer.  To address the causal claim, I estimate IV 
models that utilize the ratio of the state child support collections per administrative expenditures 
an instrument.  The IV model relies on the assumption that the state level child support policy 
measure is significantly correlated to the level of child support income received by single 
mothers in the sample but is uncorrelated with the unobserved component of the employment 
equation. 
 The results suggest that child support income does impact the employment decision of 
single mothers.  Specifically, a $1,000 increase in child support income increases the probability 
of paid employment by 6.7 percentage points for previously married mothers.  I find that the 
effect of child support income is concentrated among previously married single mothers with a 
high school diploma or less education.  For this group, a $1,000 increase in child support income 
leads to a 18.2 percentage points increase in the probability of paid employment. 
 Although the OLS estimates suggest a positive relationship between child support income 
and paid employment of never-married single mothers, the  results were  because the instrument 
was a weak predictor of child support income.  There are several reasons why the child support 
policy variable may have been a weak predictor.  First, since TANF allowed states to abolish the 
$50 pass-through, it is questionable how much incentive single mothers had to cooperate with 
the OCSE to establish paternity.  Second, never-married mothers are likely to pursue child 
support when the relationship with the noncustodial parent dissolves and this information is 
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unavailable in the SIPP.  Thus, the alternative strategy of measuring the child support variable 
during the year of their first child’s birth may be inappropriate.  Last, child support enforcement 
may reduce the amount of informal child support provided by the noncustodial father by forcing 
him to make payments that are used to offset the public assistance afforded to the single mother 
or by forcing him to participate in the underground economy.  As never-married mothers 
comprise an increasing share of single parent households and are most likely to be impoverished 
compared to other family types, more work needs to be done to examine the determinants of 
child support receipt for this group. 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 75 
 
 
Table 2.1  OLS estimates of the Probability of Paid Employment as a Function of Child 
Support Income 
 Dependent Variable:  Dummy = 1 if Paid 
Employment 
 Marital Status 
 All Never-
married 
Previously-married 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Real Child Support Income 
($1,000) 0.0084*** 0.0171*** 0.0071** 
 (0.0025) (0.0059) (0.0027) 
Black -0.0211 -0.0443* 0.0042 
 (0.0141) (0.0237) (0.0183) 
Hispanic 0.0016 -0.0282 0.0227 
 (0.0322) (0.0468) (0.0249) 
Age 0.0377*** 0.0543*** 0.0201*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0041) (0.0060) 
Age Squared -0.0005*** -0.0008*** -0.0003*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Number of kids eligible -0.0411*** -0.0465*** -0.0375*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0105) (0.0072) 
Age youngest child < 6 -0.0580*** -0.0287 -0.1083*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0215) (0.0204) 
Separated 0.0353**  -0.0384*** 
 (0.0145)  (0.0138) 
Divorced 0.0619***   
 (0.0118)   
Less than HS diploma -0.1978*** -0.2006*** -0.1803*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0231) (0.0178) 
Some College 0.0488*** 0.0603*** 0.0420*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0177) (0.0131) 
Bachelor’s degree or more 0.0866*** 0.0752** 0.0916*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0334) (0.0145) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0067 -0.0044 -0.0076 
 (0.0077) (0.0160) (0.0063) 
Log TANF -0.0848 0.1453 -0.2684*** 
 (0.1191) (0.2152) (0.0997) 
Constant 0.7152 -0.7653 1.7749*** 
 (0.6264) (1.1543) (0.4841) 
 0.131 0.1349 0.1007 
Number of Observations 8082 3519 4563 
Source.—Author’s estimation of eq. (1) using the 1996, 2001, and 2004 panels of the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation.   
Note.--All monetary variables are measure in real 1995 dollars, adjusted using the CPI.  
All models include year and state fixed effects.  Standard errors clustered at the state level 
are in parentheses. 
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Table 2.2.  IV estimates of the Probability of Paid Employment as a 
Function of Child    
              Support Income 
 Dependent Variable:  Dummy = 1 
if Paid Employment 
    
 All  Previously-
married 
Independent Variable (1)  (2) 
Real Child Support Income 
($1,000) 
0.0542  0.0671* 
 (0.0508)  (0.0389) 
Number of kids eligible -0.0542***  -0.0631*** 
 (0.0154)  (0.0161) 
Age youngest child < 6 -0.0484***  -0.0912*** 
 (0.0145)  (0.0249) 
Separated 0.0173  -0.0192 
 (0.0179)  (0.0221) 
Divorced 0.027   
 (0.0369)   
Less than HS diploma -0.1849***  -0.1489*** 
 (0.0231)  (0.0283) 
Some College 0.0312  0.0123 
 (0.0226)  (0.0233) 
Bachelor’s degree or more 0.054  0.039 
 (0.0439)  (0.0421) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0084  -0.0101 
 (0.0069)  (0.0087) 
Log TANF -0.1209  -0.3343*** 
 (0.1211)  (0.1137) 
Constant 0.9058  2.1966*** 
 (0.6315)  (0.5757) 
 
0.0863  . 
Number of Observations 8082  4563 
    
First-Stage CSE Collections Per 
Expenditure Estimates: 
0.4114  0.5457 
 (0.1118)  (0.1539) 
First-Stage F-Statistic: 13.5353  12.5744 
Source.—Author’s estimation of eq. (1) using the 1996, 2001, and 2004 panels of the Survey 
of Income and Program Participation.   
Note.--All monetary variables are measure in real 1995 dollars, adjusted using the CPI.  All 
models include year and state fixed effects.  Controls for respondent’s age, age squared, and 
race.  Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. 
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Table 2.3.  IV estimates of the Probability of Paid Employment as a Function of 
Child Support Income, Sample Stratified by Education 
 Dependent Variable:  Dummy = 1 if Paid 
Employment 
  Education Level  
 HS Diploma 
or Less 
Some College  
Independent Variable (1) (2)  
Real Child Support Income ($1k) 0.1824** -0.0336  
 (0.0905) (0.0421)  
Number of kids eligible -0.1010*** -0.0188  
 (0.0283) (0.0193)  
Age youngest child < 6 -0.0737* -0.1165***  
 (0.0431) (0.0364)  
Unemployment Rate -0.0112 -0.0149  
 (0.0207) (0.0122)  
Log TANF -0.4375* -0.2804  
 (0.2492) (0.2406)  
Number of Observations 2397 1489  
    
First-Stage CSE ratio: 0.4139 0.8665  
 (0.1349) (0.2765)  
First-Stage F-Statistic: 9.4201 9.8227  
Source.—Author’s estimation of eq. (1) using the 1996, 2001, and 2004 panels of the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation.   
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Table A2.1.  Means and Standard Deviations of Analysis Variables 
 
 
 
Full Sample  Never-married  Previously-married 
 All Received CS 
Income 
 All Received CS 
Income 
 All Received CS 
Income 
Variable  Yes No   Yes No   Yes No 
CS Support 
Received 
0.38 1.00 --  0.26 1.00 --  0.48 1.00 -- 
Real CS 
Income 
($1K) 
1.08 2.85 --  0.48 1.84 --  1.57 3.29 -- 
 (2.17) (2.72) --  (1.29) (1.96) --  (2.58) (2.89) -- 
Enrolled 0.17 0.17 0.17  0.21 0.21 0.21  0.14 0.15 0.13 
Paid Job 0.76 0.83 0.71  0.68 0.77 0.65  0.82 0.86 0.78 
Black 0.32 0.22 0.37  0.48 0.46 0.49  0.18 0.12 0.24 
Hispanic 0.16 0.12 0.19  0.17 0.12 0.19  0.15 0.11 0.18 
Age 34.69 35.74 34.04  29.76 30.28 29.58  38.63 38.14 39.08 
 (9.13) (8.24) (9.58)  (8.22) (7.47) (8.46)  (7.81) (7.37) (8.17) 
Number of 
Kids 
1.72 1.79 1.68  1.66 1.73 1.64  1.77 1.81 1.73 
 (0.95) (0.92) (0.97)  (0.96) (0.96) (0.96)  (0.94) (0.90) (0.98) 
Age 
youngest kid 
< 5 
0.16 0.14 0.16  0.20 0.20 0.20  0.12 0.12 0.13 
Separated 0.15 0.15 0.16  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.28 0.21 0.34 
Divorced 0.40 0.55 0.31  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.72 0.79 0.66 
No HS 
Diploma 
0.19 0.12 0.24  0.26 0.19 0.28  0.14 0.08 0.18 
Some 
College 
0.30 0.36 0.27  0.26 0.32 0.24  0.33 0.37 0.30 
Bachelor’s 
Degree  
0.11 0.14 0.10  0.07 0.07 0.07  0.15 0.17 0.14 
State UE 
Rate 
5.25 5.16 5.31  5.27 5.17 5.31  5.24 5.15 5.32 
 (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)  (1.00) (0.98) (1.00)  (1.00) (1.01) (1.00) 
Ln(TANF 
payment) 
5.78 5.77 5.78  5.78 5.75 5.79  5.77 5.77 5.77 
 (0.42) (0.41) (0.43)  (0.42) (0.41) (0.43)  (0.42) (0.40) (0.43) 
Ln(CSE 
ratio) 
1.27 1.31 1.25  1.32 1.37 1.31  1.23 1.28 1.19 
 0.40 0.39 0.40  0.37 0.35 0.38  0.41 0.40 0.41 
Observations 8082 3064 5018  3519 931 2588  4563 2133 2430 
Note.--The table shows the means and standard deviations (for only continuous variables) from the SIPP 
sample discussed in the text.  All financial variables are in real 1995 dollars, adjusted using the CPI. 
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Table A2.2.  First Stage OLS estimates of CS income as a Function of State OCSE  
                   collections per expenditures. 
 Dependent Variable:  Real CS Income         ($1,000) 
  Marital Status  
 All Never-married Previously-
married 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Log OCSE collections per 
expendure 0.4114*** 0.0858 0.5457*** 
 (0.1118) (0.0870) (0.1539) 
Black -0.5962*** -0.1984** -0.9631*** 
 (0.0668) (0.0835) (0.0855) 
Hispanic -0.4352*** -0.135 -0.5405*** 
 (0.0844) (0.0967) (0.1229) 
Age 0.0344* 0.0401** 0.0901*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0181) (0.0284) 
Age Squared -0.0004 -0.0005* -0.0011*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Number of kids eligible 0.2861*** 0.0498** 0.4238*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0211) (0.0366) 
Age youngest child < 6 -0.2166*** 0.0021 -0.2880*** 
 (0.0551) (0.0466) (0.0990) 
Separated 0.3844***  -0.3602*** 
 (0.0901)  (0.0883) 
Divorced 0.7814***   
 (0.0597)   
Less than HS diploma -0.2738*** -0.1130** -0.5142*** 
 (0.0432) (0.0439) (0.0940) 
Some College 0.3730*** 0.1828*** 0.4889*** 
 (0.0673) (0.0615) (0.1082) 
Bachelor’s degree or more 0.6966*** 0.2026 0.8641*** 
 (0.0902) (0.1356) (0.1321) 
Unemployment Rate 0.0398 0.0534 0.046 
 (0.0418) (0.0381) (0.0729) 
Log TANF 0.6388* 0.3333 0.9185 
 (0.3777) (0.3583) (0.6300) 
Constant -3.8834* -2.2807 -6.8972** 
 (2.1237) (1.8871) (3.2024) 
 0.1269 0.0496 0.1109 
Number of Observations 8082 3519 4563 
    
F-Statistic 13.5353 0.9734 12.5744 
Source.—Author’s estimation of eq. (1) using the 1996, 2001, and 2004 panels of the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation.   
Note.--All monetary variables are measure in real 1995 dollars, adjusted using the CPI.  All models 
include year and state fixed effects.  Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE EFFECTS OF TEEN PARENTHOOD ON YOUNG ADULT OUTCOMES: EVIDENCE 
FROM TWO COHORTS OF YOUTH 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 A 2006 report from the National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy (Hoffman, 2006) 
concluded that the public cost of teen births—including costs of children’s health care, foster 
care, and incarceration, and tax revenue lost due to lower earnings by parents—reached $9.1 
billion in 2004.  The substantial costs imposed on taxpayers have led many policymakers to 
conclude that stronger disincentives for teen childbearing are needed.  However, many of the 
policies crafted to achieve this goal—such as time limits or caps on welfare benefits, welfare 
requirements for teen mothers to stay in school, and school-based programs that teach 
adolescents sex resistance skills—are designed to affect the sexual and fertility behaviors of 
females.  Moreover, despite the fact that teenage childbearing is the result of joint sexual, 
contraceptive, and pregnancy resolution decisions of males and females, much of the scholarly 
literature examining the causes and consequences of early childbearing, as well as the policies 
that affect teen pregnancy, has focused on women (Greene and Biddlecom, 2000).  Much less 
attention has been paid to the role of men, and, in particular, the socioeconomic effects of teen 
fatherhood (Hoffman, 2006; Bachrach, 2007).  Further, although the US labor market has 
experienced dramatic shifts in the structure of wages since the 1980s and significant reforms to 
various social programs, few studies have examined differences over time in the effect of teen 
parenthood. 
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 There are a number of reasons why we might expect the processes that relate early 
parenthood with labor market outcomes to differ for men and women.  First, the consequences of 
early fatherhood may be less severe for men than for women.  Men are much less likely to be the 
primary caretaker of children, so their opportunity costs of parenthood are smaller.  Moreover, 
many young fathers are non-resident, so many may be able to avoid the responsibilities (and 
subsequent consequences) of parenthood altogether.  On the other hand, some research suggests 
that marriage and fatherhood may act as a ‘civilizing force’ for some young men and may lead 
them to adopt more mature adult roles such as increased work effort, but less educational 
investment (Popenoe, 1996, Nock, 1998a,b).   Finally, the selection of teen fathers and teen 
mothers may be quite different; men are on average about two to three years older than women at 
the time of their first birth, and the proportion of all births to teen fathers is much lower than for 
teen mothers.    
There is also reason to expect that the effects of teen parenthood on labor market 
outcomes may have changed over time due to a number of social and economic changes.  The 
opportunity cost of early childbearing has increased over time as rates of return to education 
have increased.  Indeed, a vast literature has documented the shift in the US labor market that 
began in the 1980s that resulted in a dramatic rise in education related wage gaps for younger 
workers (Bound and Johnson, 1992; Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993; Katz and Murphy, 1992; 
Autor, Katz, and Krueger, 1999).  In contrast, institutional changes such as increases in the 
availability of formal child care over time have made it easier for women to combine work and 
family.  Additionally, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) of 1996 encouraged work by ending welfare as an entitlement program, requiring 
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recipients to work after two years, and placing a lifetime limit of five years on benefits paid with 
federal funds.   
For fathers, increases in non-marital childbearing over time increase the likelihood that 
men can avoid the responsibilities of fatherhood, but stricter child support enforcement over time 
will mitigate that possibility. However, it is plausible that if increased child support requirements 
reduce the return to higher earnings, work incentives may be smaller.
26
  No study of which we 
are aware has explored how gender differences in the labor market effects of teenage parenthood 
have changed over time. 
Using data drawn from two cohorts of youths from the National Longitudinal Surveys of 
Youth 1979 and 1997 (NLSY79 and NLSY97) we estimate the effect of teen parenthood on 
labor market outcomes.  Across a number of econometric strategies designed to control for 
measured and unmeasured heterogeneity—including family fixed effects and simultaneous 
equation modeling—we find that teen motherhood is associated with a lower probability of 
employment and an increased likelihood of welfare participation.  Moreover, the teen 
motherhood employment penalty is larger for women in the NLSY79 than for women in the 
NLSY97.  At ages 23 and 25, the teen motherhood poverty penalty is larger for women in the 
NLSY97 than for women in the NLSY79.   For men, our results suggest that the observed 
correlation between teen fatherhood and the socioeconomic outcomes studied are diminished 
when controlling for unobserved family-level characteristics.  We also find that our conclusions 
remain the same after controlling for education. 
 
                                               
26 Freeman and Waldfogel (1998) find negligible effects of child support enforcement on male labor supply, which 
is consistent with the general finding in the literature that male labor supply is inelastic with respect to taxes.  In 
contrast, Holzer, Offner, and Sorensen (2005) find that child support enforcement contributed to a significant 
portion of the decline in employment among black men aged 25-34 that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. 
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II. Background 
 There is a sizable literature on the consequences of teen parenthood for women.  Most studies in 
the economics and sociology literature find evidence of a negative relationship between teenage 
childbearing and educational attainment for women, but estimates of the size of this relationship 
vary widely across studies.  There are several explanations for this negative correlation.  Early 
childbearing may have a negative causal effect on schooling for women because childrearing is 
time intensive and raises the opportunity costs of investing in human capital.  Alternatively, 
selection may explain part, or all or the association, if observed and unobserved factors are 
associated with both early childbearing and schooling. 
Early studies addressed the role of selection by controlling for observable characteristics 
such as parental education, income, test scores, and mother’s age at first birth (Card & Wise, 
1978; Hoffereth & Moore, 1979; McElroy, 1996; Upchurch & McCarthy, 1990; Blackburn et al., 
1993; Waite & Moore, 1978).  These studies generally found that conditioning on observables 
reduced the estimated effect of teenage motherhood on schooling, but the negative effect that 
remained was significant and substantial (see Hoffereth, 1987 for a review).
27
  However, as 
Hoffman (1998) notes, these findings are upper-bound estimates of the economic consequences 
of teen motherhood given that other hard-to-measure factors—for example, personal discount 
rates, family attitudes, or peer group characteristics—may explain some, or all, of the estimated 
association.   
A second set of studies restrict their samples to sisters and estimate family fixed effect 
that controls for family characteristics that are common to siblings and that may be associated 
with both teen motherhood and schooling outcomes (Geronimus & Korenman, 1992, 1993; 
                                               
27
 Similar results are found using propensity score matching methods that ensure that the teen and non-teen birth 
groups are comparable with respect to the distribution of background characteristics (Levine & Painter, 2003). 
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Hoffman et al 1993; Bennett et al.,1995; Levine & Painter, 2003; and Ribar,1999).  The results 
of these studies suggest that OLS estimates overstate the adverse effects of early motherhood, 
but the magnitude of the estimated bias differs across studies and might be explained, in part, by 
differences in the composition of sibling pairs across datasets.  
While controlling for family-level heterogeneity is informative, concerns about individual 
heterogeneity (or reverse causality) remain.  To overcome the shortcomings of family fixed 
effects models, some studies have used instrumental variables techniques (Ribar, 1994; Rindfuss 
et al., 1980; Klepinger et al., 1995, 1999; Marini, 1984; and Olsen & Farkas, 1989).  This 
method requires identifying instruments that provide exogenous variation in fertility that is 
unrelated to unmeasured determinants of schooling or labor market outcomes.  Instruments used 
in the literature include age of menarche, local abortion rate, and the availability of family 
planning and abortion services.  Results using instrumental variables also differ across studies, 
though they generally point to modest adverse effects of teenage childbearing.  One recent study 
by Hotz et al. (2005) uses a natural experiment that compares the outcomes of teenage mothers 
with the outcomes of females who became pregnant as teens, but miscarried.  They find that any 
effect is small and only exists in the short-run.   More recently, Fletcher and Wolfe (2009) and 
Ashcraft and Lang (2006) also use miscarriages as natural experiments and find some evidence 
of modest negative schooling effects.  
Methods that have been used to examine the consequences of teen motherhood on 
educational attainment have also been utilized to examine the effect of teen motherhood on labor 
market outcomes.  For example, Klepinger et al. (1999) use state and county-level costs of 
abortion as instruments for teen fertility.  They find that teen motherhood reduces teenage work 
experience, and for white women only, adult work experience. Moreover, they find that through 
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reductions in human capital, teen fertility reduces market wages at age 25.  Hotz, McElroy, and 
Sanders compare those who gave birth as a teen to those who miscarry and find that teen 
motherhood appears to increase work experience and labor market earnings, a finding that is not 
consistent with standard theory.  They also find that teen childbearing reduces the chances of 
living in poverty and participating in various social welfare programs.  More recently, Fletcher 
and Wolfe (2009) provide evidence that miscarriages are unlikely to be random events.  Using 
the timing of miscarriages as well birth control choices prior to pregnancy, they construct more 
relevant control groups and find that teen motherhood reduces annual income as a young adult 
by $1000 to $2400 and may increase the probability of receiving cash assistance. 
 Empirical evidence on the economic effects of early fatherhood is much less developed 
than in the literature for women, and the results for men are more variable than are the results for 
women.  Most studies have treated teen fatherhood as exogenously determined and the results 
have been mixed.  One study finds a positive relationship between early fatherhood and 
employment (Lerman, 1993), some studies document negative relationships, especially for 
schooling and earnings (Robbins & Streetman, 1994; Brien & Willis, 1997; Card & Wise, 1978), 
and still other studies find insignificant or mixed results (Marsiglio, 1987; Berrington et al, 2005; 
Sigle-Ruston, 2005).   
Nock (1998) provided the first innovation in the fatherhood literature to address the role 
of family-level heterogeneity by comparing brother pairs from the NLSY79.  He finds some 
weak evidence of a negative relationship between early fatherhood and school attainment, 
though much of the effect appears to be driven by non-marital fatherhood.  Fletcher and Wolfe 
(2010) use data from the Add Health to compare labor market outcomes of teenage males whose 
female partners had miscarried to teenage fathers.  Despite small sample sizes, they find that teen 
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fatherhood is increases full-time employment probabilities as well as military employment, but 
find no statistically significant effects on overall employment status, idleness, total family 
income, or labor income. 
Our work contributes to the literature on teen fatherhood in a number of ways.  First, 
rather than rely on a single empirical approach, our work will use multiple methods across 
multiple data sources to examine robustness of the relationship between teenage parenthood and 
labor market outcomes.  We use a number of identification strategies designed to control for 
family- and individual-level heterogeneity, including OLS, propensity score matching, family 
fixed effects, and simultaneous equation modeling.  Second, we will do parallel analyses for men 
and women within datasets, using the same methodological strategies to better isolate 
heterogeneity in effects of early childbearing by gender.    Finally, we explore how the labor 
market consequences of teenage parenthood have changed over time by exploiting data drawn 
from two cohorts of youth.  Few studies in the existing literature have examined changes in the 
effects of teen motherhood and fatherhood over time.   
 
III. Data and Measures 
Data.  This paper relies on data from two sources: the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth (NLSY79) and the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97).  Each 
provides panel data on fertility and labor market outcomes for men and women from large, 
nationally representative samples, and collects detailed information about respondents’ family 
and other background characteristics.  Comparing estimates across the data sets will enable us to 
examine changes over time in the effect of teen parenthood on labor market outcomes, because 
respondents were ages 15 to 19 in different years, spanning 1972-83 and 1995-2003. 
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The NLSY79 is a large U.S. sample of 12,686 men and women born between 1957 and 
1964.  The data include an oversample of blacks, Hispanics, low-income whites, and youth 
enrolled in the military.  Respondents were first interviewed in 1979 when they were 14-22 and 
were re-interviewed annually until 1994 and biannually after that.  In 2002, respondents were 
ages 38-45 and had largely completed their childbearing years. We find that 1,597 women and 
709 men report having had a birth (or fathering a child) before the age of 20.  One advantage of 
the NLSY79 is the relatively low-attrition rate.  The total sample retention rate through 1994, the 
year that all respondents were age 29 and older, is 89 percent.   
The structure of the NLSY79 provides another analytic advantage:  the household 
sampling frame resulted in 2,448 households with one or more siblings included in the data set, 
which will allow for the estimation of family fixed effects models.  One disadvantage, however, 
is that many of the respondents were already in their late teens or early 20s at the first survey.  
For this group, fertility information is retrospective rather than prospective, and there are fewer 
individual and family background characteristics in the data that were measured prior to age 15, 
the age that we use to define the beginning of the risk period for teen fertility.   
The NLSY97 samples 8,984 men and women born between 1980 and 1984 and, like the 
NLSY79, includes an oversample of blacks and Hispanics.  Respondents were first interviewed 
in 1997 when they were 12-17 and have been interviewed annually since that time.  By 2005 
(round 9), the year that all respondents were age 20 and older, 464 males and 916 females had 
reported having a teen birth. Similar to the NLSY79, these data also employ a household 
sampling frame that includes in the sample all age appropriate members of the household.  This 
results in 1862 households with one or more siblings included in the data set. The NLSY97 also 
have reasonably high retention rates:  82% of the original sample was interviewed in round 9.  
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Although the respondents are still relatively young—in round 12, the most recent round 
available, respondents are only ages 24 to 28—this age is sufficient to measure our labor market 
outcomes of interest, employment and poverty status, SNAP participation, and earnings.   
The longitudinal nature of the NLSY datasets allows us to examine the effect of teen 
parenthood on labor market outcomes at different ages.  For each measure, we analyze the effect 
of teen parenthood at ages 20, 23, and 25.  The first, , is an indicator set equal to 1 if 
the respondent was employed during week 42 of the year in which the respondent turned age , 
for ; the second, , is an indicator set equal to 1 if the respondent’s 
household income during the year prior to the respondent turning age  was below poverty line; 
the third, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ( ), formerly known as the food 
stamp program, is an indicator set equal to 1 if the respondent received SNAP benefits during 
previous calendar year that respondent turned age  .; the last, , is the amount of income 
the respondent earned from during  prior to the year when the respondent turned age .  
Following Klepinger, Lunderberg, and Plotnick (1999), outcomes were measured at age  if 
a missing value was encountered for measure at age .  For example, if data on earnings are 
missing for respondent at age 25, we use earnings for calendar year prior to year when individual 
turned age 26.  Appendix Table 3.1 shows, at each age, the share of males employed is 
consistently higher in both cohorts than the share of female respondents who are employed.  In 
addition, at each age, males are less likely than females in both cohorts to participate in the 
SNAP program and to be in poverty. It is also the case that, at each age, males also tend to earn 
more than females.  However, the male/female earnings gap appears to be smaller in the later 
cohort than in the earlier cohort.  Interestingly, for males and females and at each age, SNAP 
participation and poverty incidence has increased from the earlier to the later cohort. 
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Our primary independent variable of interest, Teen birth, is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the respondent mothered or fathered a child as a teenager; and zero otherwise.   
A potential threat to the validity of the results involves the reporting of births.  For example, 
previous research has found both under-reporting of fathering and under-representation of fathers 
in a number of national data sets (Rendall et al. 1999; Cherlin and Griffith 1998).  These studies 
also suggest that underreporting is more likely for those who fathered children outside of 
marriage.  Our results will be biased if underreporting is correlated with the outcome of interest.  
Joyner et al. (2012) has conducted a number of analyses assessing the quality of male fertility 
reports comparing reports from survey data with rates estimated from vital statistics.  Results 
show that while there is some underreporting, the degree of underreporting of fertility data in the 
NLSY79 and NLSY97 for men is not large.  There are several reasons why data quality issues 
may be less of a problem in the NLSY.  First, these are panel data, allowing for the collection of 
fertility data shortly after births occur. Rendall et al. (1999) suggest that panel data are likely to 
capture a higher proportion of male fertility than retrospective data.  In addition, considerable 
efforts have made in cleaning up the male fertility date in the NLSY79 (Mott and Gyrn 2001).
28
  
 In Appendix Table 3.2, we show the mean proportion of the dependent variables by 
nonmarital birth status.  We find consistent evidence across gender and cohorts that having a 
teenage birth is significantly and negatively related to socioeconomic status.  For example, 
women in the NLSY79 and the NLSY97 who have experienced a nonmarital teen birth are 34.8 
and 21.2 percentage points more likely than women in their respective cohorts who have not 
experienced a nonmarital teen birth to be in poverty at age 25.  Additionally, women in both 
cohorts who experienced a nonmarital teen birth are more likely than women in their respective 
                                               
28
 We use variables available in the public-use NLYS79 data to create best estimates of women’s age at first birth 
and data compiled by Mott and Gyrn (2001) for male fertility that includes his best estimate of the date of each birth.   
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cohorts who did not experience a nonmarital teen birth to be SNAP participants.  In both cohorts, 
the socioeconomic costs of nonmarital childbearing appear to be larger for women than for men.  
For men in both cohorts, having a nonmarital birth is associated with a reduced likelihood of 
employment and greater likelihood of SNAP participation.    However, a number of patterns also 
become apparent.  The employment rate for teen fathers at ages 23 and 25 has decreased in the 
later cohort and SNAP participation has increased for all men in the later cohort at all ages under 
consideration.  Further, the percent of teen fathers in poverty at ages 20 or 23 is smaller in the 
NLSY97 than in the NLSY79.   
 
IV. OLS Estimation Results  
 While the cross-tabulations in Table 3.1 provide some descriptive evidence that the 
socioeconomic costs of teen parenthood may have increased changed time, these correlations 
may be due to a number of individual or family background characteristics.  Thus, we begin by 
estimating a parsimonious ordinary least squares regression of the following form: 
     
where Eir is a measure of respondent i’s socioeconomic measure at age ; Xi is a vector of 
controls; and Teen Birthi is the indicator variable defined above.  Controls in Xi are measured at 
age 14 and include dummies for black, Hispanic, mother’s education (less than high school and 
greater then high school with high school grad being the omitted group), type of family (step 
family, single family, and no parent family, with two biological parents being the omitted group), 
urban, oldest child, and whether the mom was working full-time.   
Our focus is on the estimate of 2.  If 2 is less than zero this could be interpreted as 
evidence that, as hypothesized, teenage parenthood is associated with a lower measure of 
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socioeconomic status.  We estimate equation (1) for each of our datasets and correct the standard 
errors for heteroskedasticity.   
Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 present OLS estimates of the effect of teen parenthood on adult 
outcomes at age 20, 23, and 25, respectively by sex and cohort.
29
  For women, OLS estimates in 
Table 3.3.1 suggest that the nonmarital birth penalty is larger at 20 for women in the earlier 
cohort than women in late cohort, but tend to converge at later ages.    For instance, a nonmarital 
birth reduces the likelihood of employment at age 20 by 19.6 percentage points for women in 
NLSY79, but reduces the probability of employment by only 7.7 percentage points for women in 
the NLSY97.  Similarly, OLS estimates suggest that a nonmarital birth reduces the earnings of 
women age 20 in the NLSY79 cohort by 39 percent
30
, but reduces the earnings for women from 
the NLSY97 cohort by only 5 percent.  However, Table 3.3 shows that teen childbearing reduces 
employment by approximately 12-13 percentage points at age 25 for women in both cohorts.  
The convergence of the OLS teen birth estimates is witnessed for all outcomes.   
 The OLS estimates suggest the impacts of a teen birth on adult outcomes are 
smaller for men than for women.  For males, a teen birth is associated with a decrease in the 
probability of employment of between 1 and 7 percentage points. However, the effect of teen 
childbearing on employment is significant for men only at age 25.  Interestingly, the positive 
association between poverty and teen childbearing is statistically insignificant for men in the 
NLSY79 at ages 23 and 25, but remains statistically significant and positive for men in the 
NLSY97.  The results also suggest that teen childbearing has a larger effect on men’s likelihood 
of food stamp receipt in later cohorts.  For example, at age 20, a teen birth increases the 
                                               
29
 Weighted regression results produce qualitatively similar results.  Moreover, the marginal effects produced by a 
logistic regression as opposed to a linear probability model are similar to those shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. 
30
 Since the dependent variable is log earnings, the coefficient reflects a percent change in earnings. 
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likelihood of SNAP participation by 11 percentage points for men in NLSY97, but only by 1 
percentage points for men in the NLSY79.   
 
V. Family Fixed Effects 
While suggestive, one particular concern with OLS estimates is that the teen birth 
indicator is endogenous.  In other words, teen childbearing may be related to an unobserved 
determinant of socioeconomic outcomes such as motivation to work in formal sector.  Thus, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that unobservable family-level characteristics can explain, in part 
or in whole, the relationship between teen parenthood and adult socioeconomic outcomes. To 
address the issue of family-level unobservables, we restrict our sample to children who have the 
same mother, j, and estimate a family fixed effects model of the following form:  
   
where j is a vector of family fixed effects and the vector Xi includes a set of individual-level 
characteristics that differ across siblings.   
Family fixed effects estimates appear in rows 3 and 7 in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, with 
rows 2 and 6 showing OLS estimates on the comparable sample.
31
  For the sample of sisters 
(Panel I), our results suggest that the inclusion of family fixed effects does not eliminate the 
negative relationship between teen motherhood and the probability of employment for women in 
the NLSY79.   Controlling for family fixed effects, teen motherhood is associated with a 15.8, 
13.7, and 13.5  percentage point decline in the probability of employment at ages 20, 23, and 25, 
respectively for women in NLSY79, where the result at age 25 is statistically insignificant.  For 
                                               
31
 Family fixed effects models can only be estimated for a sample with more than one adolescent in a family. 
Therefore, to assess whether any differences in results are due to the empirical technique or to the different sample, 
we also report OLS results from the same sample as the family fixed effects models.  
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women in the NLSY97, the fixed-effects estimate of teen childbearing on the probability of 
employment is diminished and no longer statistically significant.  Nevertheless, for women in 
both cohorts and all ages, the fixed-effects estimate of teen childbearing on probability of SNAP 
participation remains positive and statistically significant at conventional levels.  For men, fixed-
effects estimates of teen childbearing on all the outcomes studied are insignificant.  This suggests 
that, for men, much of the observed correlation between teen childbearing and adult 
socioeconomic outcomes are due to unobserved heterogeneity. 
  
VI. Simultaneous Equation Modeling 
While fixed-effects estimates control for family-level unobservables, it does so at the expense of 
excluding a large fraction of the sample.  Simultaneous equation modeling addresses the 
unobserved family-level heterogeneity without excluding respondents without sibling present in 
sample.  The simultaneous equation framework consists of two components: a hazards model for 
teen childbearing and a probit model or OLS model for the adult outcome of interest.  Each 
component includes a family specific random effect which allows for the influence of 
unmeasured time-invariant characteristics of the family on each outcome.  These residuals may 
be correlated across processes, allowing for the possibility that the risk of teen childbearing and 
labor outcomes may be influenced by a common set of unobserved characteristics.  The direction 
and magnitude of this residual correlation provides information on the nature and extent of 
selection on time-invariant family characteristics.  For example, when analyzing SNAP 
participation, a positive correlation would suggest that children from families with an above 
average risk of having a teen birth tend to be more likely to participate in the SNAP program.   
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 In addition to controlling for time-invariant unobserved characteristics at the family-
level, the model controls for characteristics of the family or respondent measured prior to age 15.  
The model also assumes that the family-specific effect is the same for all respondents in the same 
family.  Thus, to the extent that children have different attitudes and/or parents treat children 
differently, failure to allow for unmeasured family-specific characteristics means that some bias 
will likely remain. 
Model for Teen Birth 
Let  denote the teen birth hazard for individual  in year .  The model allowing for 
unobserved heterogeneity between respondents may be written 
  
The teen birth log-hazard is assumed to depend on age minus 10 at year t through a function 
, the baseline log-hazard rate.  We assume that  is a piecewise-linear spline with nodes 
dispersed at ages 16, 17 and 18.  Covariates  are time-invariant individual and family 
characteristics.  For each respondent,   represents the value of a collection of unobserved traits 
drawn from a normal distribution with variance  at age 10, which affect the respondent’s risk 
of teen birth. 
Binary outcomes are modeled using a probit model.
32
  The probit model is defined in 
terms of a continuous latent variable or propensity  underlying the observed binary response 
, where  if  and  otherwise for .  A multilevel model that 
allows for unobserved heterogeneity at the family level can be written: 
  
                                               
32
 Log earnings are estimated using an OLS model. 
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where  is the endogenous teen birth indicator with coefficient , and  is a vector of 
background characteristics of the family and the respondent with coefficients .  Instead of 
focusing on adult outcomes at one point in time, this framework allows us to examine the effect 
of teen parenthood on adult outcomes at different ages. 
 In a similar manner to Eq. (3), we include a family specific random effect , which here 
represents the time-invariant characteristics of the family that affect the education decision at 
each for each respondent in family .  We assume that the  follow a normal distribution with 
mean zero and variance .  These random effects have age-specific coefficients, .  Thus, 
although the same unmeasured family characteristics are assumed to influence progression at all 
at each age, their effects may differ across ages. Additionally, the model also includes residuals 
 that are specific to a particular respondent and age and are assumed to follow independent 
standard normal distributions. 
 Together, Eqs. (3) and (4) define a multilevel multiprocess model.  The equations are 
connected in two ways.  First, the teen birth indicator   in (4) is a prior outcome of the teen 
fertility process in (3).  Second, we allow for the possibility of a nonzero correlation between the 
unmeasured family-specific components  and .  In particular,   and    are assumed to 
follow a bivariate normal distribution with correlation .  A value of  that is significantly 
different from zero would suggest that the teen birth indicator is endogenous with respect to the 
adult outcome of interest. 
 The presence of  in all three labor equations in (4) and the correlation between  and 
, means that Eqs. (3) and (4) must be estimated simultaneously.  The software we used for this 
analysis is aML (See Lillard and Panis, 2000). 
 98 
 
Rows 4 and 8 of Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 contain the teen birth estimates from the 
simultaneous equation models.  Once again, the results suggest that the impact of teen 
childbearing on the probability of employment and earnings are largest for women in the earlier 
cohort.  For example, teen childbearing reduces the probability of employment by 20.4 and 1.5 
percentage points at age 20 for women in the NLSY79 and NLSY97 cohorts respectively.  By 
age 25, the analogous results are 12.8 and .3 percentage points.  Interestingly, the effect of teen 
childbearing on probability of being impoverished is largest at ages 23 and 25 for women in later 
cohorts than women in earlier cohorts.  The results from the simultaneous equation model also 
suggest that teen childbearing increases the likelihood of participating in the SNAP program at 
all ages for women in both cohorts. 
 For men, the results in row 8 in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 suggest that teen childbearing has 
a modest effect, at best, on the socioeconomic outcomes studied.  For men in both cohorts, teen 
childbearing is associated with higher earnings at ages 20 and 23 (although only significantly 
different from zero in one case) and a statistically insignificant reduction in earnings at age 25.  
There is also some evidence that, at age 20, teen childbearing increases the probability of SNAP 
participation for men in the NLSY97. 
 Estimates of the parameters associated with the family-specific random effects in the 
simultaneous equation model are listed in Table 3.4. These results show that there is residual 
correlation at the family level between a respondent’s socioeconomic status and a risk of teen 
childbearing, which is reflected in the estimate of a significant and positive correlation between 
the random effects for SNAP participation and teen childbearing equations, : the individuals 
with an above-average risk of dissolution (  > 0) tend to have above-average chances of 
participating in the SNAP program (  < 0). 
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VII. Conclusion  
 Using data from two cohorts of youths drawn from the NLSY79 and the NLSY97, we 
estimate the relationship between teen parenthood and various socioeconomic outcomes.  Across 
a wide set of identification strategies designed to control for unmeasured family- and individual-
level heterogeneity—including family fixed effects and simultaneous equation modeling—we 
find that teen motherhood is negatively related to employment and positively related to poverty 
and SNAP participation.  Moreover, we find that negative effect of teen childbearing on 
employment is larger for women in the NLSY79 than women in the NLSY97, but that the effect 
of teen childbearing on poverty and SNAP participation is similar for women in both cohorts.  
This suggests that changes in social programs since the 1990s may have been successful at 
encouraging single mothers to work, but that wages and public assistance benefits may have 
lagged behind inflation. 
 In regards to men, our results show that the association between teen fertility and the 
socioeconomic outcomes we investigate is smaller for men than for women, very often close to 
zero and statistically insignificant.  Estimates from methods that account for unobserved 
heterogeneity are almost all insignificant, suggesting that the correlation between teen 
childbearing and socioeconomic outcomes studied appear to be due to unobserved factors that 
affect both the teen childbearing decision and decisions related to one’s socioeconomic status.   
Thus, while the teen childbearing penalty to teen fathers is small, at most, and has 
remained fairly stable across cohorts, the adverse effects of teen motherhood on poverty appear 
to be larger at later ages in more recent cohorts.  These results are consistent with a number of 
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possible explanations, including the general decline across cohorts in real value of public 
assistance benefits and the minimum wage.   
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Table 3.1  Effects of Teen Parenthood on Young Adult Outcomes- Age 20 
   Employed Log Earnings Poverty 
   NLSY79 NLSY97 NLSY79 NLSY97 NLSY79 NLSY97 
W
o
m
en
 
OLS (1) -0.196*** -0.0773*** -0.387*** -0.0466 0.241*** 0.144*** 
SE (0.0233) (0.0204) (0.0929) (0.0542) (0.0246) (0.0211) 
N 3,714 3,949 2,883 3,105 3,389 3,402 
OLS 
w/ FE 
Sample 
(2) -0.165*** -0.0415 -0.199 0.0201 0.239*** 0.191*** 
SE (0.0335) (0.0312) (0.1240) (0.0785) (0.0351) (0.0328) 
N 1,906 1,639 1,509 1,292 1,754 1,436 
Family 
Fixed 
Effects 
(3) -0.158** 0.0585 -0.466 0.0445 0.209** 0.0816 
SE (0.0793) (0.0839) (0.3590) (0.2520) (0.0860) (0.0773) 
N 1,906 1,639 1,509 1,292 1,754 1,436 
aML
1
 (4) -0.204*** -0.015 -0.438*** -0.025 0.182*** 0.125*** 
       
N 1,906 1,639 1,509 1,292 1,754 1,436 
                  
M
en
 
OLS (5) -0.00707 -0.0262 0.000543 0.121* 0.0555* 0.0510** 
SE (0.0310) (0.0253) (0.0916) (0.0664) (0.0318) (0.0255) 
N 3,752 4,094 3,146 3,289 3,470 3,362 
OLS 
w/ FE 
Sample 
(6) -0.00345 -0.058 0.0127 0.0544 0.0507 0.0504 
SE (0.0416) (0.0373) (0.1150) (0.0981) (0.0430) (0.0374) 
N 2,077 1,748 1,719 1,389 1,910 1,430 
Family 
Fixed 
Effects 
(7) 0.00963 -0.00696 0.391 0.308 -0.0849 0.0548 
SE (0.0876) (0.1060) (0.3350) (0.2880) (0.1110) (0.1070) 
N 2,077 1,748 1,719 1,389 1,910 1,430 
aML
1
 (8) 0.032 0.008 0.121 0.191*** 0.01 0.046 
       
N 2,077 1,748 1,719 1,389 1,910 1,430 
Notes:  Each cell represents a separate regression.  Controls: mother’s education, birth order, test 
scores, family structure, race, urban status, dummies for missing variables 
 
1
Marginal effects from the aML models are calculated using the parameter estimates from the 
outcome equation.  Specifically, we draw 100 random effect values from a normal distribution 
with mean zero and standard deviation of the random effect estimated from the model to 
calculate predicted outcomes.  We then average the result.  Significance levels are based on the 
original parameter estimates. 
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                       Table 3.2  Effects of Teen Parenthood on Young Adult Outcomes- Age 23 
   Employed Log Earnings Poverty 
   NLSY79 NLSY97 NLSY79 NLSY97 NLSY79 NLSY97 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 W
o
m
en
 
OLS (1) -0.132*** -0.115*** -0.275*** -0.195*** 0.191*** 0.147*** 
SE (0.0239) (0.0200) (0.0810) (0.0489) (0.0255) (0.0202) 
N 3,612 3,835 2,798 3,132 3,088 3,325 
OLS 
w/ FE 
Sample 
(2) -0.111*** -0.0962*** -0.268** -0.149** 0.203*** 0.136*** 
SE (0.0342) (0.0313) (0.1150) (0.0711) (0.0369) (0.0305) 
N 1,852 1,614 1,460 1,304 1,582 1,409 
Family 
Fixed 
Effects 
(3) -0.137* 0.0236 -0.385 0.188 0.155 0.0319 
SE (0.0794) (0.0872) (0.3620) (0.2540) (0.0969) (0.0944) 
N 1,852 1,614 1,460 1,304 1,582 1,409 
aML
1
 (4) -0.091*** -0.015*** -0.339*** -0.131*** 0.053*** 0.104*** 
       
N 1,852 1,614 1,460 1,304 1,582 1,409 
                  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
M
en
 
OLS (5) -0.042 -0.0365 -0.0901 0.00856 0.0328 0.0783*** 
SE (0.0288) (0.0234) (0.0899) (0.0561) (0.0308) (0.0262) 
N 3,639 3,961 3,129 3,366 3,072 3,325 
OLS 
w/ FE 
Sample 
(6) -0.0513 -0.0785** -0.00813 -0.0131 0.056 0.0476 
SE (0.0380) (0.0355) (0.1140) (0.0832) (0.0427) (0.0371) 
N 2,016 1,696 1,715 1,417 1,689 1,406 
Family 
Fixed 
Effects 
(7) 0.0239 0.082 0.0391 0.191 0.0359 -0.0355 
SE (0.0865) (0.0991) (0.2420) (0.3160) (0.1270) (0.1180) 
N 2,016 1,696 1,715 1,417 1,689 1,406 
aML
1
 (8) 0.011 0.004 0.02 0.068 -0.011 0.057* 
       
N 2,016 1,696 1,715 1,417 1,689 1,406 
Notes:  Each cell represents a separate regression.  Controls: mother’s education, birth order, test 
scores, family structure, race, urban status, dummies for missing variables 
 
1
Marginal effects from the aML models are calculated using the parameter estimates from the 
outcome equation.  Specifically, we draw 100 random effect values from a normal distribution 
with mean zero and standard deviation of the random effect estimated from the model to 
calculate predicted outcomes.  We then average the result.  Significance levels are based on the 
original parameter estimates. 
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                         Table 3.3  Effects of Teen Parenthood on Young Adult Outcomes- Age 25 
 
   Employed Log Earnings Poverty 
   NLSY79 NLSY97 NLSY79 NLSY97 NLSY79 NLSY97 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
o
m
en
 
OLS (1) -0.128*** -0.116*** -0.275*** -0.213*** 0.200*** 0.149*** 
SE (0.0238) (0.0196) (0.0738) (0.0520) (0.0258) (0.0225) 
N 3,584 3,872 2,806 3,109 2,999 2,617 
OLS 
w/ FE 
Sample 
(2) -0.128*** -0.154*** -0.144 -0.301*** 0.186*** 0.147*** 
SE (0.0335) (0.0307) (0.0915) (0.0844) (0.0368) (0.0341) 
N 1,854 1,618 1,456 1,303 1,534 1,110 
Family 
Fixed 
Effects 
(3) -0.135 0.008 -0.123 -0.136 0.14 0.0635 
SE (0.0833) (0.0817) (0.2610) (0.2460) (0.1000) (0.1310) 
N 1,854 1,618 1,456 1,303 1,534 1,110 
aML
1
 (4) -0.128*** -0.003 -0.339*** -0.156*** 0.082*** 0.102*** 
       
N 1,854 1,618 1,456 1,303 1,534 1,110 
                  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 M
en
 
OLS (5) -0.0643** -0.0702*** -0.107 -0.142** 0.0402 0.0668** 
SE (0.0284) (0.0238) (0.0937) (0.0602) (0.0317) (0.0276) 
N 3,575 3,999 3,160 3,372 2,831 2,632 
OLS 
w/ FE 
Sample 
(6) -0.0568 -0.0674* -0.102 -0.274*** 0.0585 0.0953** 
SE (0.0382) (0.0350) (0.1160) (0.0972) (0.0433) (0.0427) 
N 1,987 1,711 1,736 1,416 1,558 1,125 
Family 
Fixed 
Effects 
(7) -0.004 -0.0377 0.212 0.326 -0.0972 -0.158 
SE (0.0966) (0.0986) (0.2830) (0.3250) (0.1420) (0.1540) 
N 1,987 1,711 1,736 1,416 1,558 1,125 
aML
1
 (8) -0.021 -0.03 -0.011 -0.071 0.005 0.038 
       
N 1,987 1,711 1,736 1,416 1,558 1,125 
Notes:  Each cell represents a separate regression.  Controls: mother’s education, birth order, test 
scores, family structure, race, urban status, dummies for missing variables 
 
1
Marginal effects from the aML models are calculated using the parameter estimates from the 
outcome equation.  Specifically, we draw 100 random effect values from a normal distribution 
with mean zero and standard deviation of the random effect estimated from the model to 
calculate predicted outcomes.  We then average the result.  Significance levels are based on the 
original parameter estimates. 
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Table 3.4  aML Estimates of the Relationship between All Teenage Parenthood and 
Educational Attainment 
 ρ is the correlation between the random effect in the specific outcome equation and the random 
effect in the fertility equation.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
33
 The log-likelihood for the earnings model may not reflect the global maximum.  
 Women  Men  
 79 97 79 97 
Employed ( ) 0.139 -0.503 *** -0.230 -0.149 
 (0.181) (0.132) (0.167) (0.171) 
Poverty ( ) 0.301 0.070 0.192 0.035 
 (0.193) (0.164) (0.185) (0.217) 
SNAP ( ) 0.543 *** 0.514 *** 0.460 0.524 *** 
 (0.160) (0.119) (0.421) (0.174) 
Log Earnings ( )
33
 0.042 -0.002 -0.026 -0.036 
 (0.255) (37837.227) (0.000) (894228.617) 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix Table 3.3.1:  Means for Dependent Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
NLSY79  NLSY97   
Women Men Women  Men 
Full  Full  Full  Sibling  Full  
Employed 20 0.610 0.728 0.687 0.683 0.685 
Employed 23 0.697 0.845 0.753 0.743 0.806 
Employed 25 0.721 0.885 0.760 0.761 0.821 
Earnings 20 $7,194.77 $11,091.69 $7,448.21 $7,498.64 $10,662.23 
(Standard 
Deviation) $7,367.27 $11,379.92 $7,783.25 $7,407.49 $10,572.34 
Earnings 23 $12,307.32 $18,117.20 $13,826.81 $13,801.44 $18,353.16 
(Standard 
Deviation) $11,400.64 $15,657.40 $12,852.00 $12,586.52 $15,437.63 
Earnings 25 $15,471.05 $24,698.97 $16,766.49 $16,844.58 $23,112.27 
(Standard 
Deviation) $13,853.84 $18,313.92 $15,424.08 $15,296.83 $19,064.31 
Poverty 20 0.196 0.153 0.226 0.236 0.173 
Poverty 23 0.165 0.120 0.177 0.173 0.139 
Poverty 25 0.157 0.091 0.163 0.159 0.119 
SNAP 20 0.075 0.008 0.094 0.099 0.025 
SNAP 23 0.081 0.014 0.149 0.151 0.053 
SNAP 25 0.082 0.014 0.168 0.168 0.062 
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Appendix Table 3.2 Means of Dependent Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NLSY79 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Teen Birth  No Yes No Yes 
Employed 20 0.640 0.356 0.731 0.661 
Employed 23 0.722 0.478 0.848 0.774 
Employed 25 0.747 0.502 0.890 0.760 
Earnings 20 7,657.458 3,282.046 11,160.830 9,404.987 
 
(7,391.179) (5,845.735) (11,426.940) (10,019.250) 
Earnings 23 13,099.910 5,574.998 18,265.340 14,527.200 
 
(11,496.700) (7,786.652) (15,546.850) (17,757.510) 
Earnings 25 16,340.900 8,031.597 25,013.750 16,853.230 
 
(13,936.170) (10,514.020) (18,300.310) (16,846.110) 
Poverty 20 0.159 0.517 0.146 0.330 
Poverty 23 0.131 0.466 0.114 0.264 
Poverty 25 0.123 0.471 0.087 0.200 
SNAP 20 0.033 0.430 0.007 0.033 
SNAP 23 0.051 0.341 0.011 0.079 
SNAP 25 0.054 0.317 0.012 0.045 
 
NLSY97 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Teen Birth  No Yes No Yes 
Employed 20 0.707 0.584 0.686 0.670 
Employed 23 0.787 0.594 0.812 0.742 
Employed 25 0.791 0.613 0.831 0.711 
Earnings 20 7,630.510 6,560.994 10,502.580 12,466.680 
 
(7,503.928) (8,967.225) (10,329.030) (12,872.870) 
Earnings 23 14,812.060 9,208.953 18,579.420 15847.500 
 
(12,523.850) (13,353.980) (15,474.690) (14791.570) 
Earnings 25 18,080.520 10,684.460 23,599.720 17,767.780 
 
(15,320.530) (14,410.260) (19,146.710) (17,255.640) 
Poverty 20 0.200 0.359 0.166 0.251 
Poverty 23 0.139 0.358 0.130 0.237 
Poverty 25 0.124 0.336 0.109 0.222 
SNAP 20 0.037 0.371 0.016 0.132 
SNAP 23 0.086 0.446 0.042 0.177 
SNAP 25 0.111 0.422 0.054 0.152 
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